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Abstract
Cloud service providers are often trusted to be genuine, the damage caused by being dis-
covered to be attacking their own customers outweighs any benefits such attacks could reap.
On the other hand, it is expected that some cloud service users may be actively malicious. In
such an open system, each location may run code which has been developed independently of
other locations (and which may be secret). In this paper, we present a typed language which
ensures that the access restrictions put on data on a particular device will be observed by all
other devices running typed code. Untyped, compromised devices can still interact with typed
devices without being able to violate the policies, except in the case when a policy directly places
trust in untyped locations. Importantly, our type system does not need a middleware layer or
all users to register with a preexisting PKI, and it allows for devices to dynamically create new
identities. The confidentiality property guaranteed by the language is defined for any kind of
intruder: we consider labeled bisimilarity i.e. an attacker cannot distinguish two scenarios that
differ by the change of a protected value. This shows our main result that, for a device that runs
well typed code and only places trust in other well typed devices, programming errors cannot
cause a data leakage.
1 Introduction
Organisations commonly trust their cloud providers not to be actively malicious but may still need
to verify that the cloud service does not make mistakes and does store their data at particular
locations. For example, data protection laws prevent the storage of certain forms of data outside
the European Union. In order to ensure compliance, a company policy may require that data from
a user’s device not be synchronized with a cloud storage provider, unless that provider can certify
that the data will not be stored in data centers outside the EU. Such checks against inappropriate
storage of data can be costly and time consuming, sometimes leading to organisations not allowing
their employees to use cloud services, even though a particular cloud service may be known to be
compliant with data handling policies.
This paper presents a language-based approach to dealing with these kinds of scenarios, of
ensuring that data can be shared with cloud services while ensuring compliance with policies on
data storage. The approach is based on a type system that explicitly models trust between cloud
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services and mobile devices, based on a notion of principals represented at runtime by cryptographic
keys. In this language, principals are dynamically associated to (non-disjoint) sets of devices, and
the rights of devices to access data is based on sets of principals (delineating the principals that
are allowed to access protected data). For instance, if two devices A and B can (individually) act
for a principal P , while devices B and C can act for principal Q, then the right {P,Q} implicitly
allows the devices A, B and C to access data guarded by this right. We argue that this two-layer
representation of access rights (data guarded by principal rights, and devices acting for principals)
is convenient to allow principals to share a device, and to allow one principal to use several devices
(laptop, mobile phone etc.)
Based on this type system, we present a language that includes most of the primitives necessary
for secure imperative programming (multi-threading, references, secure channel establishment, and
cryptographic ciphers). A key feature of this language is the ability for new principals to dynam-
ically join the network (in the sense of making network connections to cloud services and other
devices) without having to register to any public key infrastructure (PKI) or to use a particular
middleware layer1.
Our threat model assumes some “honest” collection of principals (e.g. the employees of an
enterprise) and some collection of devices acting for those principals (e.g. devices provided to those
employees). A device may act for several principals, in the sense that it may issue access requests
on behalf of any of the principals that it acts for), while a principal may be associated with several
devices. We describe the devices acting for these principals as honest devices, in the sense that
they are certified according to the type system presented in this paper to be in conformance with
data sharing policies. We refer to the corresponding principals for these devices as “honest” rather
than “trusted” because trust management is an orthogonal issue for the scenarios that we consider.
Our threat model also allows for “dishonest” or untyped devices, acting for outside principals, who
should not be able to access the data. These are the attacker devices. Our security guarantee is
that, as long as no honest device provides access to a dishonest principal, the dishonest devices
will not be able to obtain any information from any honest devices, unless an honest device has
explicitly given the attacker access.
This capability is critical for cloud services. While it is reasonable to assume that there exists
a PKI to certify the identities of cloud providers, and that cloud providers are trusted by their
users, client devices and their corresponding principals are unlikely to have certificates. While an
infrastructure for mutual authentication, based on client and server X509 certificates, might be
provided as part of an enterprise data sharing network, there are difficult issues with extending
this trust model to third party cloud service providers. Furthermore, such a PKI does not provide
the level of confidence in conformance with data-sharing protocols, that our approach provides for
honest (well-typed) devices. Instead of requiring such a global PKI, the approach described in this
article represents principals by cryptographic public keys, and these are stored on devices like any
other values. Our type system therefore uses a nominal form of dependent types, to reflect these
runtime representatives of principal identity to the type system, where access rights on data are
tracked through security labels attached to types.
Another contribution of the paper is a security guarantee suitable for our threat model. As
stated above, in an open network, we must allow for “dishonest” devices that are unchecked (un-
1 Although middleware for e-commerce (such as CORBA) was popular in the 1990s, that approach was discred-
ited by experience, while SOAP-based approaches have been largely superseded by REST-based Web services, that
deliberately eschew the notion of a middleware at least for Internet communication..
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typed), and potentially malicious. These devices are able to use any third-party cloud services,
including services used by honest devices. A secure data-sharing system should remain robust to
such an intruder. Our security guarantee is that if data is protected with rights that only includes
honest principals (i.e., that do not include any principal which is associated to an attacker device),
then an attacker cannot learn any information about that data. In this work, we are focused
on confidentiality of the data, and do not consider integrity (that data has not been tampered
with by attackers). There is a notion of integrity in the sense of trust management underlying
our approach: Honest principals identify themselves by their public keys, and these keys are to
state access restrictions on data, to specify when a device is allowed to “act for” a principal, and
to validate that communication channels are with honest parties trusted to be type-checked and
therefore conformant with data-sharing policies. This is reflected in several aspects of the commu-
nication API, including the establishment of communication channels, generating new principals
and transmitting those principals between devices.
A practical difficulty with expressing security guarantees in this setting is that, as principals
can be created dynamically, it is not possible to statically check if a variable has a higher or lower
security level than some other variable. Consider the following example:
Example 1 Assume three devices: an honest cloud service with a certified principal p, and two
(mobile) devices, an honest device A and a malicious device B. The server code consists of receiving
two principal values p1 and p2 from the network before it creates two memory locations x1 and x2
where x1 has rights {p, p1} while x2 has right {p, p2}. A secure location is defined one which cannot
be accessed by the attacker. If we assume that devices A and B send their principal values (public
keys) to the server, then depending on which key is received first, either x1 or x2 will be considered
secure (only accessible by the honest principal and the cloud provider), while the other is explicitly
accessible by the attacker. As usual with information flow control type systems, we propagate these
access restrictions through the handling of data by the cloud provider and the devices, ensuring that
data protected by the right {p, pi}, where pi is the representative for the honest principal.
Therefore, our security property is a posteriori: once the system has created a memory cell corre-
sponding to some variable, if the rights associated to this variable at creation time did not include
a principal controlled by the attacker, then there will never be any leak about the contents of
this memory cell to the attacker. We argue that such a property is suitable for cloud services to
increase users’ confidence that their data will not be leaked by the service due to a programming
error. Indeed, our system allows us to certify that once some principal creates data, only explicitly
authorised principals can obtain information about that data, by statically checking the code that
processes that data. Verifying the identity of the principals allowed to access the data, and deciding
where to place trust among the principals in a distributed system, is an important consideration.
However it properly remains the responsibility of the application written in our language, and a con-
cern which is independent of this type system. Our approach serves to guarantee proper handling
of data among honest principals, once an appropriate trust management system has established
who is honest.
Our typed language is intended to be a low level language, without high-level notions such
as objects and closures. It includes consider references, multi-threading and a realistic applica-
tion programming interface (API) for distributed communication. Communications can either be
through a secure channel mechanism, implementable using a secure transport layer such as TLS
for example, or through public connections, in which case any device can connect. The language
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includes primitives for asymmetric key encryption, since we represent by public keys. “Possessing”
a secret key, in the sense that the private key of a public-private key is stored in its memory, allows
a device to “act for” the principal that key represents. Our approach is similar in philosophy to the
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI), where principals and public keys are considered as syn-
onymous, rather than linking principals to a separate notion of public key representatives. However,
we do not include notions such as delegation that are the central consideration of SPKI, since we
explicitly avoid the consideration of trust management, leaving that to applications written using
the API that we provide. This also differentiates our approach from frameworks such as JIF and
Fabric, that include delegation of authority to principals based on an assumed trust management
infrastructure.
Nevertheless, there is a notion at least tangentially relegated to delegation of trust in our
framework: In order to allow a device to act for more than one principal, our semantics allows a
principal to be created on one device and communicated to another device, where it is registered
on the receiver device as one of the principals upon whose behalf that device can access data. For
example, a client of a cloud service provider may generate a proxy principal representing that client
on the cloud service, and then upload that principal to the cloud service in order to access data that
the client is storing on the cloud service. This ability to share principals across devices is controlled
by restrictions established when proxy principals are generated: Such a proxy (client) principal can
only be registered on a device that acts for (cloud service) principals that are identified at the point
of generation of the proxy.
The security analysis of the type system uses standard techniques from the applied-pi calculus
[1]. This allows us to prove our correctness property as a non-interference property based on process
equivalence, i.e., two systems differing by one value are indistinguishable by any party that is not
allowed to access this value. The standard pi-calculus includes message-passing with structured
values, but does not include an explicit notion of memory (although it can obviously be modeled
using processes as references). Since our language combines message-passing communication and
localized stateful memory, we use the stateful applied pi-calculus [2] as the starting point for our
security analysis. This calculus does not explicitly model location (i.e., the distinction between
two processes on the same device and two processes on two distinct devices). Since this distinction
is critical for our security analysis, we add this notion in our calculus. Nevertheless the proof
techniques that we employ are heavily based on those developed for the stateful applied pi-calculus.
The security analysis that we perform expresses that data are secure if keys received from other
devices are not associated to an attacker. To formalise this conditional statement, we need more
techniques than in a standard protocol where data are either secret or public, but their status does
not depend on the execution. In our verification in subsection 5.3, we introduce an extended syntax
that marks which keys, variables and channels are secure in the current trace. We then prove that
when a new memory location is created with a secure key according to this marking, then the
attacker cannot distinguish between two scenarios: one where the system reduces normally, and
another one where the memory location is sometimes altered to another value. This is the basis
for our noninterference property for the security guarantee provided by this approach.
In the next section we discuss related work. In Section 3 we present our language, type system
and semantics. In Section 4 we present an extended example and in Section 5 present our result
and outline the proof, then we conclude in Section 6. Appendix A provides addtional type rules
for the language considered in this paper. Appendix B considers proofs of correctness omitted from
Section 5. Appendix C considers addtional operational semantics rules for the “open” semantics
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that enables us to reason about interactions with untyped attackers.
2 Related Work
Implicit flow Implicit information flow properties involve the ability for an attacker to distin-
guish between two executions. Previous work that has provided type systems to control implicit
information flow [19, 3] considered high and low data, and this could be extended to a bigger lattice
but not to the creation of new principals, as the security of a variable is defined statically. Zheng
and Myers presented an information flow type system that includes dynamic checks on rights [21]
which can be used, for instance, when opening a file. The Jif Project [16] adds security types to a
subset of Java, leading to a powerful and expressive language. Unlike our work, this other work does
not address how to enforce principal identities and type information to be correctly communicated
to other locations.
Security properties on distributed system Work on type security for distributed systems
can be distinguished according to the kind of security they aim to provide. Muller and Chong
present a type system that includes a concept of place [15] and their type system ensures that
covert channels between “places” cannot leak information. Vaughan et al. look at types that
can be used to provide evidence based audit [11, 18]. Fournet et al. look at adding annotations
with a security logic to enforce policies [10]. Liu and Myers [13] look at a type system which
ensures referential integrity in a distributed setting. This work uses a fix lattice of policy levels,
which does not change at runtime. The Fabric language [12] provides decentralised, type-enforced
security guarantees using a powerful middleware layer for PKI, and Morgenstern et al. [14] extend
Agda with security types. In contrast, our work allows programs to generate new principals at
run-time and provides a security property that tracks implicit information flow, without requiring
the support of a purpose built middleware layer or global PKI. Due to the fact that the attackers
in our model can access services in the same way as honest principals, this security property is an
adaptation of the bisimulation property which is a strong property introduced in the (s)pi-calculus
by [1]. Bisimilation can be checked for processes by tools like Proverif [5] but these kind of tools
do not scale up to large systems.
Managements of new principals Bengtson et al. [4] present a security type system which
allows creation of dynamic principals in presence of an untyped attacker. However, this type
system provides only assertion-based security properties of cryptographic protocols. These are
weaker than non-interference properties as they are expressed on one process instead of comparing
two processes. [7] considers a framework in which principals can be created at run time (without a
global PKI) they prove type soundness rather than a non-interference result. Finally, the DSTAR
program [20] achieves these two goals but is focused on network information and relies on local
systems to actually analyse implicit flow, which leads to a more coarse system.
Safety despite compromised principals Past work [6] has looked at un-typed attackers in a
security type system, however this work only considers a static number of principals, fixed at run
time. Fournet, Gordan and Maffeis [9] develop a security type system for a version of the applied pi-
calculus extended with locations and annotation. Their type system can enforce complex policies
on these annotations, and they show that these policies hold as long as they do not depend on
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P,Q ::= νc¯.D devices sharing channels c¯
D ::= 〈M ◮ C〉 | D C running with M
| 0 no device
M ::= {} a memory which maps . . .
| {x 7→ v} ∪M . . . a variable
| {p 7→ P} ∪M . . . a principal name
| {k′ 7→ k+} ∪M . . . a key name
v ::= i an integer
| k+ the value of a public key
| encLR,n(v) a cipher of v with seed n
| encLR,n(pv) an encapsulated principal
| {v1, . . . vn} an array of values
| NaV a special error value
pv ::= prin(k+, k−,LR) a principal value
LR ::= {k+} ∪ LR a set of public keys
| { }
c¯ ::= {}
| c¯.c c : established channel
Figure 1: The syntax of devices, values, principals and rights where k−/k+ is a secret/public key
pair.
principals that have been compromised. Unlike our work they assume that the principals are all
known to each other and there is a direct mapping from each location to a single principal that
controls it. Our work allows principals to be dynamically created, shared between locations and for
locations to control multiple principal identities. We argue that this model is a better fit to cloud
systems in which users can dynamically create many identities and use them with many services.
3 Language: Semantics and Type System
3.1 Syntax
The syntax of our language is given in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. We let x, y, z range over variable
names Nv, p, p1, p2, . . . range over principal names Np, k1, k2, . . . range over public key names Nk
and c, c1, c2, . . . range over channel names Nc. A system νc¯.D1 | . . . | Dn is a set of devices that
run in parallel and that communicates through channels of c¯.
The list c¯ records which channel names correspond to establish channels (globally bound).
Channel also appear in connect and accept commands in the devices, and these are added to c¯ once
the channel is opened. When there are no established channels, we omit the ν{}. prefix. Note that
to guarantee freshness of keys and nonce used in encryption, we might also provide global binders
k¯ and n¯ in addition to c¯. However this guarantee is straightforward to provide, using “freshness”
predicates, so for readability reasons we omit explicit binders for generated keys and nonces.
A device consists of a memory M and a command C. Memories associate variable names with
values, key names with keys and principal names with principals.
Given a nonce k from some assumed set of key nonces, we define (k+, k−) as the public pri-
6
S ::= PubKey a public key
| PrivKeyEnc an encapsulated private key
| Int integers
| Enc{S} encrypted data of type S
| Array{S} an array of type S
R ::= RS a set of rights
| ⊥ no restriction
RS ::= { } the empty set
| {K} ∪RS K added to a set of rights
K ::= k1, k2, . . . , public key names
| {pub(p)} the public key of a principal
Figure 2: The types syntax
vate key pair generated from k, where .+ and .− are two constructors. A principal pv is a tuple
prin(k−, k+,LR) which contains a key pair (k−, k+), together with a (possibly empty) set of public
key values LR. When a device has pv in its memory, it is allowed to act for pv. Devices that can
act as a principal pv0, whose public key k0
+ is one of the public keys in LR, are allowed to add pv
to their memory.
Each variable x in Nv represents a reference to a value i.e. variables are mutable. At declaration
time, a reference is associated with some rights R, which cannot be revoked or changed. Making all
variables mutable is convenient for our security analysis: it allows us to define non interference as
the property that a parallel process that alters the value of a high-level variable cannot be detected
by an attacker. If variables were not mutable we would have to consider a much more complex
security property and proof. In addition, to avoid to consider scope of variables, we assume that a
command never declares twice the same name for variables, channels, keys and principals.
Types (Figure 2) for these variables consists of a pure-type S which indicates the base type
for the value of the variable (e.g. integer, public key, cipher, etc.) and a label (or right) R which
indicates the principals who are allowed to access to the variable. A label can be either ⊥ i.e. the
variable is public or a set which contains public key names: k ∈ Nk and pub(p) where p ∈ Np.
Key names are declared by a command let k = x in C. This command copies the value of the
reference x into k which represents a public key (not a reference to a public key). The type system
(deref T) ensures that x in this command is an unrestricted public key: x : PubKey⊥.
Channel types are declared when they are established, we have two kinds of channel: public
and secure channels. Their types have syntax Chan(SR1)R2 where SR1 is the type of values that
are past over the channel and R2 expresses which principals are allowed to know the existence of c
and when communication on this channel takes place.
3.2 Semantics
The semantics of the system is defined as a small-step semantics for commands and as a big-step
semantics for expressions. Devices run concurrently with synchronized communication between
them. Inside each device, all parallel threads run concurrently and communicate through the
shared memory of the device (since memory is mutable). The main reduction rules are presented
in Figure 5 for commands and in Figure 6 for main expressions. When a command that declares
7
C ::= if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2
| new x :SR = e; C
| x := e; C
| x[e1] := e2; C
| let k = x in C
| C1 | C2
| skip
| ! C
| connect c :Chan(S⊥)⊥; C
| accept c :Chan(S⊥)⊥; C
| connect c :Chan(SR)R′ to k as p; C
| accept c :Chan(SR)R′ from k as p; C
| output c〈e〉; C
| input c(x); C
| synchronized{G};C2
| newPrin pRS ;C
| decryptp e as x :SRS then C1 else C2
| registerp1 e as p2 then C1 else C2
Figure 3: The syntax of the commands.
a new variable is reduced, the name is replaced by a fresh name that represents a pointer to the
location in the memory where the value has been stored. The evaluation of expressions has the
form M(e) = v: the evaluation of e with memory M returns the value v. We note that this is
different from some other calculi, in which variables are not references, and are replaced with a
value when declared. Our correctness statement below depends on the use of references and, since
we have a memory mechanism, we prefer to store the key names and principal names in memory
and instead of applying a substitution, the names are evaluated when a command reduces (cf the
(rights RS) rules).
Principals are generated using the newPrin pRS ;C command, where RS are the keys to use to
protect the principal (and therefore cannot ⊥). The rule for this command (newPrin S) generates
a fresh key pair (k+, k−) and stores the principal prin(k+, k−,LR) at a new location p′ in the
memory, where M(RS) = LR. To bootstrap the creation of these principals, they can be declared
with RS = {}; such principal identities can only be used on a single device, they cannot be sent
over channels. Additionally some devices may start off with the public keys of some trusted parties,
i.e., the same assumption as TLS. This too lends itself well to cloud systems, in which web browsers
come with a number of trusted certificates.
Communication between devices uses Java like channels: a channel is first established then it
can be used to input and output values. The channel establishment is done by substituting the
channel names in both devices by a unique fresh channel name added to c¯ (we assume that initial
channel names and active channel names range over distinct sub-domains of Nc to avoid collision).
Note that channels do not name the sending and receiving device as these may be spoofed by an
attacker, however, to get a more tuneable system, it would be a simple extension to add a port
number which would restrict possible connections. For secure channels (open priv S), in a similar
way to TLS with client certificates, both devices must provide the public key k+ of who they want
8
e ::= x, y, . . . variable names
| pub(p) the public key of p
| release(p) pack a principal
| encRS(e) encrypt some data
| e1 ⊕ e2 where ⊕ is +,−,×, . . .
| {e1, . . . en} an array of expressions
| x[e] an element of an array
| i an integer i ∈ Z
Figure 4: The syntax of the expressions
to connect to. They must also provide the principal (which includes a private key) to identify
themselves to the other party. To set up a secure channel, the client and the server also have to
ensure that they are considering the same rights for the channel. For that they have to exchange
the value of their channel right M(Chan(SR1)R2) and make sure that it corresponds to the distant
right value M ′(Chan(SR′
1
)R′
2
). Indeed, even if type-checking is static inside a device, type-checking
has to be dynamic between distinct devices since programs are type-checked on each device and
not globally.
Example 2 (Principal set up) Assume that a cloud service C has a public key c+, which is
known to Alice and Bob, and that Alice wants to share some private data with Bob using this
cloud service. Alice can do this using the code shown in Figure 7. Alice starts by generating a key
pair (a−, a+). As neither Alice nor Bob have certificates, Bob just sends his key publicly to Alice
over a public channel. Alice receives it, and creates a new variable to be shared with Bob and the
cloud service. She then opens a secure channel with the cloud that is typed to allow data of type
{a+, b+, c+}, the ⊥ right on this channel indicates that, while the data on the channel must be kept
confidential, the knowledge that some value has been sent is not. This fragment of code does not
authenticate Bob, this could be done using another protocol, or offline, but we will show that if the
device that sent her this key, and the cloud server, both run well typed code, then she is guaranteed
that the secret will only be shared by the device sending the key, the cloud server and herself. She
knows that no leak can come from, for instance, bad code design on the cloud device.
The encRS(e) expression, governed by the (enc E) rule, encrypts the evaluation of e for each of
the public keys ki
+ named in RS, i.e., anyone that has a single private key corresponding to any ki
+
can decrypt it, the set of all ki
+ is also included in the encryption. We use randomised encryption
to avoid leakage that would occur otherwise when the same value is encrypted twice, and we model
this by including a fresh nonce in the encryption. The decryptp e as x : SRS then C1 else C2
command reduces successfully (dec true S) when e evaluates to a ciphertext encRS,n(v) that can
be opened by the secret key of p and that the LR, which is packed into the encryption, is a subset
of the evaluation of RS.
The release(p) expression reduces by encrypting the principal p for each of the set of public
keys representing the principals that can access it. It is the only way to produce a value which
contains a secret key and therefore to send private keys through a channel. The register command
behaves as decrypt except that it deals with encrypted principals instead of encrypted values.
All other semantics rules are standard except that instead of returning run-time error (division
by 0, illegal offset index etc.) expression returns a special value NaV. This feature is critical to
9
fresh(k+, k−) fresh(p′) M(RS) = LR
νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C ′ | newPrin pRS ;C〉 → νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {p
′ 7→ prin(k+, k−,LR)} ◮ C ′ | C{p′/p}〉
(newPrin S)
M(e) = v fresh(y)
νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C ′ | new x :SR = e; C〉 → νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {y 7→ v} ◮ C
′ | C{y/x}〉
(new S)
M(e) = v2
νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {x 7→ v1} ◮ C
′ | x := e; C〉 → νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {x 7→ v2} ◮ C
′ | C〉
(assign S)
fresh(k′) M(e) = k+
νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C ′ | let k = e in C〉 → νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {k′ 7→ k+} ◮ C ′ | C{k′/k}〉
(deref S)
M(p) = prin(k+, k−,LR2) M(e) = encLR,n(v) k
+ ∈ LR M(RS) ⊆ LR fresh(y)
νc¯.D | 〈M◮C ′ |decryptp e as x :SRS then C1 else C2〉
→ νc¯.D | 〈M ∪ {y 7→ v} ◮ C ′ | C1{y/x}〉
(dec true S)
fresh(c)
νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | connect c1 :Chan(S⊥)⊥;C1〉 | 〈M2 ◮ C
′′ | accept c2 :Chan(S⊥)⊥;C2〉
→ νc¯.c.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | C1{c/c1}〉 | 〈M2 ◮ C
′′ | C2{c/c2}〉
(open public S)
fresh(c) M1(ps) = prin(k1
−, k1
+,LRs) M2(pc) = prin(k2
−, k2
+,LRc)
M1(R1) =M2(R2) M1(R
′
1) =M2(R
′
2) M1(kc) = k2
+ M2(ks) = k1
+
νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | accept c1 :Chan(SR1)R2 from kc as ps;C1〉
|〈M2 ◮ C
′′ | connect c2 :Chan(SR′
1
)R′
2
to ks as pc;C2〉
→ νc¯.c.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | C1{c/c1}〉|〈M2 ◮ C
′′ | C2{c/c2}〉
(open priv S)
M1(e) = v fresh(y)
νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | output c〈e〉;C1〉 | 〈M2 ◮ C
′′ | input c(x);C2〉
→ νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | C1〉 | 〈M2 ∪ {y 7→ v} ◮ C
′′ | C2{y/x}〉
(i/o S)
M(e) = encLR1,n(prin(k
+
1 , k
−
1 ,LR1))
M(p2) = prin(k
+
2 , k
−
2 ,LR2) k
+
2 ∈ LR1 fresh(p3)
νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C ′ | registerp2 e as p1 then C1 else C2〉 → νc¯.D |
〈M ∪ {p3 7→ prin(k
+
1 , k
−
1 ,LR1)} ◮ C
′ | C1{p3/p1}〉
(register true S)
M(e) = encLR1,n(prin(k
+
1 , k
−
1 ,LR1)) M(p2) = prin(k
+
2 , k
−
2 ,LR2) k
+
2 6∈ LR1
νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C ′ | registerp2 e as p1 then C1 else C2〉 → νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C
′ | C2〉
(register false S)
Figure 5: Main command rules
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M(p) = prin(k+, k−,LR) LR 6= {} fresh(n)
M(release(p)) = encLR,n(prin(k
+, k−,LR))
(release E)
fresh(n) M(e) = v M(RS) = LR
M(encRS(e)) = encLR,n(v)
(enc E)
M(e1) = v1 M(e2) = v2 v1 ∈ Z v2 ∈ Z
M(e1 + e2) = v1 + v2
(+ E)
M(e1) = v1 M(e2) = v2 v1 /∈ Z ∨ v2 /∈ Z
M(e1 + e2) = NaV
(error + E)
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pi 7→ prin(ki
+, ki
−,LRi) ∈M ∀i, n+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n+m, k
′
i 7→ ki
+ ∈M
M({pub(p1), . . . ,pub(pn), k
′
n+1, . . . , k
′
n+m}) = {k1
+, . . . , kn+m
+}
(rights RS)
Figure 6: Main semantic rules for expressions and rights
〈kc 7→ c
+ ◮
newPrin A{};
accept c :Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥;
input c(xb);
let kb = xb in
new secret :Int{kc,pub(A),kb} = 42;
connect upload :Chan(Int{kc,pub(A),kb})⊥
to kc as pub(A);
output upload〈secret〉;
〉
Figure 7: Alice sharing data with Bob using a cloud service. N.B. this code does not authenticate
Bob.
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guarantee the security of our system. Indeed, we allow a device to evaluate expressions with secure
variables and then to do an output on a public channel. This scenario is safe only if we can ensure
that no expression will block any thread. Note that the attacker can also send values with some
type through a channel of another type, consequently run time type errors can also occur.
Finally, the command synchronised{C} executes a command C with no communication or
interleaving of other processes. This is useful to avoid race conditions.
3.3 Types
The type judgment for expressions takes the form Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR and the type judgment for
commands takes the form pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C where Γ is a mapping from variable names to types
SR, Γc from channel names to channel type Chan(SR1)R2 , Γp is a set of principal names, Γk is a set
of public key names, and where pc is a right of form R called the program-counter. The program
counter allows to analyse programs for indirect secure information flow [8]. Figure 8 defines the
main type rules for commands and Figure 9 defines the rules for expressions and rights.
In many typing judgments, we use a condition R1 ⊆ R2 that states that R1 is more confidential
than R2. The predicate R1 ⊆ R2 holds either when R2 = ⊥ or when R1 is a syntactical subset of
R2 (no aliasing). For instance, we have {k2,pub(p)} ⊆ {k1,pub(p), k2} and {k1, k2}  {k2} even if
k1 and k2 map to the same key in memory. We also use R1∩R2 to define the syntactic intersection
of the sets R1 and R2 (which is R2 if R1 = ⊥).
Types rules for new principals and variables The typing rule for principal declaration
(newPrin T) only allows the program counter to be bottom. This restriction avoids the situation in
which a variable with a right including this principal might be less confidential than the principal
itself.
The new variable declaration (new T) checks that the rights R1 to access the new variable x
are more restrictive than (a subset of) the rights R2 of the expression being assigned and of the
program counter pc. We also ensure that one of the principal in R1 belongs to Γp. The type rule
for assignment (assign T) ensures that high security values cannot be assigned to lower security
variables.
While the semantics for new principals (newPrin S) stores the rights set LR dynamically (as
LR is only used when the principal is sent to another device), the semantics for managing variables
(new S) does not consider them: their confidentiality is entirely provided by the type system.
Example 3 We consider the following piece of code in which two new principals are declared, and
both Alice and Bob may know the value of y, but only Alice may know the value of x:
〈{} ◮ newPrin Alice{};
newPrin Bob{};
new x :Int{pub(Alice)} = 5;
new y :Int{pub(Alice),pub(Bob)} = 7;
x := y;
if(x = 1) then y := 1;
〉
Here the assignment of y to x should be allowed because x is protected by rights more confidential
than y. However, in the last line, the value of y (which Bob can read) leaks some information about
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Γp; Γk ⊢ RS pc = ⊥ pc; Γp ∪ {p}; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ newPrin pRS ;C
(newPrin T)
Γp; Γk ⊢ R1
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR2 R1 ⊆ pc ∩R2 ∃p ∈ Γp.pub(p) ∈ R1 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ∪ {x : SR1} ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ new x :SR1 = e;C
(new T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x : SR1 Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR2 R1 ⊆ pc ∩R2 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x := e; C
(assign T)
pc = ⊥ Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x : PubKey⊥ pc; Γp; Γk ∪ {k}; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ let k = x in C
(deref T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e1 : SR1
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e2 : SR2 pc ∩R1 ∩R2; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C1 pc ∩R1 ∩R2; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C2
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2
(if T)
Γp; Γk ⊢ RS1 pub(p) ∈ RS1 p ∈ Γp Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : Enc{S}R2
RS1 ⊆ (R2 ∩ pc) pc ∩R2; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ∪ {x : SRS1} ⊢ C1 pc ∩R2; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C2
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ decryptp e as x :SRS1 then C1 else C2
(dec T)
pc = ⊥ pc; Γp; Γk; Γc ∪ {c :Chan(S⊥)⊥}; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ connect c :Chan(S⊥)⊥; C
(connect 1 T)
Γp; Γk ⊢ R1 Γp; Γk ⊢ R2
p ∈ Γp k ∈ Γk {pub(p), k} ⊆ R1 ⊆ R2 ⊆ pc R2; Γp; Γk; Γc ∪ {c : Chan(SR1)R2}; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ connect c :Chan(SR1)R2 to k as p; C
(connect 2 T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR3 c : Chan(SR1)R2 ∈ Γc pc = R2 R1 ⊆ R3 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ output c〈e〉; C
(output T)
c : Chan(SR1)R2 ∈ Γc R2 = pc pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ∪ {x : SR1} ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ input c(x); C
(input T)
p2 ∈ Γp
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e :PrivKeyEnc⊥ pc; Γp ∪ {p1}; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C1 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C2 pc = ⊥
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ registerp2 e as p1 then C1 else C2
(register T)
Figure 8: Typing rules for main commands
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Γp; Γk ⊢ RS Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR RS ⊆ R
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ encRS(e) : Enc{S}⊥
(enc T)
p ∈ Γp
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ release(p) : PrivKeyEnc⊥
(release T)
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, pi ∈ Γp ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ki ∈ Γk
Γp; Γk ⊢ {pub(p1), . . . ,pub(pn), k1, . . . , km}
(rights T)
Figure 9: Types rules for non standard expressions and rights
the value of x (which Bob should not be able to read). Therefore, this is an unsafe command and
it cannot be typed.
Types rules for encryption The type rule for encrypting values (enc T) verifies that the en-
crypted value is less confidential than the set of keys used for encryption, it then types the ciphertext
as a public value, i.e., encryption removes the type restrictions on a value while ensuring that the
encryption provides at least as much protection. We note that if the encrypting key depends on
non-public data, then the program counter would not be public, which would ensured that the
ciphertext was not stored in a public variable. Hence the use of restricted keys will not leak
information.
The corresponding decryption rule (dec T) verifies that the principal p used to decrypt the
cipher is valid (p ∈ Γp) and is consistent with the rights of the decrypted value. As the knowledge
of which keys has been used to encrypt is protected with the rights R2 of the cipher, the success of
the decryption also depends on R2. Therefore, the program counter has to be at least as high as R2
when typing the continuation. Finally, as with an assignment, the rule enforces that the created
variable does not have a type that is more confidential than the program counter.
Types rules for public channels Typing rules for public channels ensures that these are only
of type public and, when they are used, the program counter is ⊥.
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Example 4 The following system illustrates the use of public channels and encryption:
〈{Alice 7→ prin(k+a , k
−
a , {}), bobPub 7→ k
+
b }} ◮
new x :Int{Alice,bobPub} = 7;
connect c : Chan(Enc{Int}⊥)⊥;
output c〈enc{pub(Alice),bobPub}(x)〉;
input c(e);
decryptAlice e as xInc :Int{pub(Alice),bobPub} then
x := xInc; 〉
| 〈{Bob 7→ prin(k+b , k
−
b , {}), alicePub 7→ k
+
a } ◮
! accept c : Chan(Enc{Int}⊥)⊥;
input c(z);
decryptBob z as w :Int{pub(Bob),alicePub} then
output c〈enc{pub(Bob),alicePub}(w + 1)〉; 〉
Alice and Bob start off knowing each other’s public keys, and Bob provides a service to add one
to any number sent by Alice. The variable x is restricted so that only Alice and Bob can know the
value. Encrypting this value removes these type protections, so that it can be sent across the public
channel c. On Bob’s device decrypting with Bob’s private key replaces these type protections.
Types rules for secure channels For secure channels (client and server side), the rule (connect 2 T)
enforces that the principal who is creating the channel and the principal being connected to, both
have the right to access the data passed over the channel, hence {pub(p), k} ⊆ R1. In order to en-
sure that the possible side effects caused by using the channel are not more restrictive than the data
passed over the channel we need that R1 ⊆ R2. The R2 ⊆ pc condition stops side channel leakage to
the device receiving the connection at the time the channel is opened. Finally, the program counter
is set to R2 once connected: this ensures both devices have the same program counter. Without
this we would have implicit leakage, for instance, one device with a public program counter could
wait for a message from a device with a non public program counter, then outputs something on a
insecure channel. As the sending of the message may depend on a value protected by the program
counter, this would result in a leakage.
We make the strong assumption that the existence of a connection attempt can only be detected
by someone with the correct private key to match the public key used to set up the connection.
If we assumed a stronger attacker, who could observe all connection attempts, we will need the
condition that pc = ⊥ at least for the client.
The output rule (output T) has two main restrictions: one which verifies that the device still
has the program counter agreed with the corresponding device, and R1 ⊆ R3 i.e., the type on the
channel is no less restrictive than the type of data sent. This is because when this data is received
it will be treated as data of type R1.
For channel creation the restriction on the channel must be at least as restrictive as the program
counter. For input and output we must additionally check that the program counter has not become
more restrictive, hence requiring that the channel restriction and the program counter are equal,
i.e., testing the value of a high level piece of data and then sending data over a lower level channel
is forbidden.
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Example 5 The different roles of R1 and R2 is illustrated in these two programs.
new x :Int{pub(Alice),bob} = 7;
accept c :Chan(Int{pub(Alice),bob}){pub(Alice),bob}
from bob as Alice;
if(x > 10){
x := x+ 1;
output c〈x〉; }
new x :Int{pub(Alice),bob} = 7;
accept c :Chan(Int{pub(Alice),bob})⊥ from bob as Alice;
{if (x > 10){
x := x+ 1; }}
| output c〈x〉;
Both programs aim at sending x to Bob, which is a secret shared by Alice and Bob. In the first
case, the sending of x depends on its value: therefore the communication should can only be on a
channel with rights Chan(Int{pub(Alice),bob}){pub(Alice),bob}. In the other example, even if the value
of x is updated due to a parallel thread that has a non public program counter, the sending of x is
unconditional.
Note that the language does not have “{if condition then C }; C ′′ structure as this construct
would not be safe: if C waits infinitely for a connection then C ′′ is not executed. However, a delay
command could be added to help the second program to output x after x has been updated.
Type rules for release and register The release command is similar to the encryption com-
mand except that the rights with which the principal is encrypted are provided by the princi-
pal value. Therefore, there is no static check to perform in (release T). The registration rule
(register T), for the same reason has less checks than (dec T). However, it does enforce that
pc = ⊥, without which we could get non public rights; revealing a such a none public right would
then be an information leak. Removing this restriction, and allowing non public rights, would be
possible in a more complex type system but we decide not to do so to keep the type system more
understandable.
4 Example: A Secure Cloud Server
As an extended example we consider a cloud server that provides a data storage service. The
motivation of our work is to make it possible to type an open cloud service, without the need for a
global PKI neither the need to verify that its users run typed programs, so ensuring that it provides
security guarantees to all of its users. The server process in Figure 10 defines an open service which
users can connect to and register to store data. This data can be shared with another principal,
hence the server takes a pair of public keys, representing the principals, when registering.
To keep the example simple this server accepts up to 3 accounts and denies further registrations.
The data for each accounts is stored in the data variable defined in the RegisterUsers process; the
restriction set used to type this variable specifies that only the server and the two clients named at
registration can have knowledge of this data. Additionally, the server keeps track of how often each
account is used (in the usage array) and runs a process to monitor the usage (the CheckUsage
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Server ≡
new usage :Array{Int}⊥ = {0, 0, 0};
new blocked :Array{Int}⊥ = {0, 0, 0};
new nextID :Int⊥ = 0;
RegisterUsers | CheckUsage
RegisterUsers ≡
! accept newUsers :Chan(Array{PubKey}⊥)⊥;
input newUsers(client1Client2);
let client1 = client1Client2[0] in
let client2 = client1Client2[1] in
synchronized {
new accountID :Int⊥ = nextID;
nextID = nextID + 1; }
if (accountID ≤ 2) then{
new data :Int{pub(Server),client1,client2} = 0;
ServeClient(client1, client2, client1)
| ServeClient(client1, client2, client2) }
CheckUsage ≡! synchronized{
new total :Int⊥=usage[0] + usage[1] + usage[2] + 3;
{ if(usage[0] > total/2) then
blocked[0] := 1 else blocked[0] := 0;
| if(usage[1] > total/2) then
blocked[1] := 1 else blocked[1] := 0;
| if(usage[2] > total/2) then
blocked[2] := 1 else blocked[2] := 0; }
ServeClient(c1, c2, c3) ≡
! accept upload :Chan(Int{Server,c1,c2})⊥
from c3 as Server;
if (blocked[accountID] = 0) then{
input upload(z);
usage[accountID] = usage[accountID] + 1;
data = z; }
| ! accept dowload :Chan(Int{Server,c1,c2})⊥
from c3 as Server;
if (blocked[accountID] = 0) then{
usage[accountID] = usage[accountID] + 1;
output download〈data〉; }
Figure 10: An example server that monitors the clients usage but not their data
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Sender ≡
accept otherPrin :Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥;
input otherPrin(mobileKey);
let mobile = mobileKey in
newPrin Alice{mobile};
accept releasedPrin :Chan(PrivKeyEnc⊥)⊥;
output releasedPrin〈release(Alice)〉;
accept c :Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥;
input c(bobKey);
output bobKey〈otherPrin〉;
let bob = bobKey in
output c〈pub(Alice)〉;
connect newUsers :Chan(Array{PubKey}⊥)⊥;
output newUsers〈{pub(Alice), bobKey}〉;
Send(Alice, bob, 42)
Send(p, k, v) ≡
connect upload :Chan(Int{srvKey,pub(p),k})⊥
to srvKey as p;
new sharedSecret :Int{srvKey,pub(p),k} = v;
output upload〈sharedSecret〉;
Mobile ≡
newPrin Mobile{};
connect keyChan :Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥;
output keyChan〈pub(Mobile)〉;
connect releaseChan :Chan(PrivKeyEnc⊥)⊥;
input releaseChan(encaps)
registerMobile encaps as MyId then
input keyChan(bobKey);
let bob = bobKey in Send(MyId, bob, 24)
Receiver ≡
newPrin Bob{};
connect fromBob :Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥;
output fromBob〈pub(Bob)〉;
input fromBob(aliceKey);
let alice = aliceKey in
connect download :Chan(Int{srvKey,alice,pub(Bob)})⊥
to srvKey as Bob;
input download(data);
Figure 11: Definitions of Sender, Receiver and Mobile Processes
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SD ≡ 〈{srvKey 7→ k+s } ◮ Sender〉
MD ≡ 〈{srvKey 7→ k+s } ◮Mobile〉
RD ≡ 〈{srvKey 7→ k+s } ◮ Receiver〉
Srv ≡ 〈{Server 7→ prin(k+s , k
−
s , {})} ◮ Server〉
System ≡ SD |MD | RD | RD | Srv
Figure 12: The server context with 4 devices: a sender with its mobile device and two concurrent
receivers
process). If any account is found to have made more than 50% of the total number of requests
(plus 3), it is temporarily blocked (by setting the corresponding index in the blocked array to 1).
The usage data and blocked status are public data. This is an example of an open cloud service
which writes to public variables after processing private data. Our type system ensures that there
is no leakage between the two.
An example configuration is given in Figure 12, with the definitions of the processes provided in
Figure 11: this configuration consists of four devices SD, MD and two identical RD devices. We
assume that, in the physical world, SD andMD are the laptop and respectively the mobile of Alice
while the two other devices RD are owned by Bob and Charlie. In the system definition, Alice’s and
Bob’s devices start off knowing the servers public key, but the server has no knowledge of Alice’s
and Bob’s principals. The mobile device MD first creates a new principal identity and shares the
public key to SD. Note that RD could also send its private key to SD at this point which is not
the expected behavior. To avoid honest users to establish unwanted connection, a port number
mechanism should be added to the connections rules. Once SD receives the principal’s public key
from MD, SD creates a new principal identity to use with the cloud service which is known by
the mobile’s principal identity. This allows SD to release and to send the new principal Alice to
MD which registers it. Therefore both SD and MD can use the service with the same account.
Finally Bob’s device RD and SD exchange their public keys, and SD sends to MD the public key
received from RD then SD registers for a shared account between pub(Alice) and bobKey on the
server. Finally, SD or MD can upload a sharedSecret value to the server. Meanwhile MD is able
to recover the last uploaded value (0 if it downloads before an upload occurs).
The security type on the variable sharedSecret means that its value can only have an effect on
other variables with the same or a more restrictive type. Importantly, our correctness result limits
knowledge of these values to just the Alice, Bob and Server devices, no matter what well-typed
code are run in these devices. On the other hand, checking the authenticity of the Bob key (with
a mechanism such as PGP, or out-of-band checks) is Alice’s responsibility.
These are exactly the guarantees that a user, or a organisation, would want before using the
cloud service. While many people trust their cloud services, and organisations enter into complex
legal agreements, leaks can still occur due to programming errors. Type checking the code, as we
outline in this paper can show that it is safe from such programming errors, and help provide the
users with the guarantees they need to use the system.
5 Security analysis
We now prove that the type system preserves confidentiality of data: when a variable is declared
with rights R then the only devices that can observe anything when the variable’s value changes
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are the devices that are allowed to know one of the keys in R.
The proof uses techniques from the applied pi-calculus, rephrased for our formalism. Our basic
result uses a notion of bisimulation formulated for reasoning about information flow in nondeter-
ministic programs [17]. Intuitively, two programs are bisimilar (for “low” observers) if each one
can “imitate” the low actions of the other, and at each step the memories are equivalent at low
locations. Note that memory can change arbitrarily at each step, reflecting the ability of concurrent
attacker threads to modify memory at any time.
The applied pi-calculus extends the well-known pi-calculus, a process calculus where commu-
nication channels may be sent between processes, with binding of variables to non-channel values.
In our approach, “memory” is this set of bindings of variables to values in the applied pi-calculus.
Also, our bisimilarity is a labelled bisimilarity since we consider communications on channels as ob-
servable events. Our correctness result shows that a high (insider) attacker cannot leak information
to low observers by communication on high channels or by modifying high locations in memory.
We explain our proof over the following five subsections. In the following subsection we annotate
devices with an identifier, so that we can keep track of particular devices as a process reduces, and
we define when a particular device is entitled to read data protected with a particular set of rights.
In Subsection 5.2 we define our untyped attacker and outline an labelled, open semantics which
defines how an “honest” (typed) process can interact with an untyped attacker process. We also
prove that this open semantics is correct with respect to the semantics presented above.
To give us the machinery we need to prove our main results, in Subsection 5.3 we annotate our
processes with the rights that apply to all variables. We show that a well annotated, well typed
process reduces to a well annotated, well typed process, this results shows that a well typed system
does not leak data, but it does not account for untyped attackers. To do this we introduce a labelled
bisimulation in Subsection 5.4. This bisimulation relation defines the attackers view of a process,
and their ability to distinguish systems. Finally, in Subsection 5.5, we prove that, for our open
semantics, a well annotated, well typed process is bisimular to another process that is the same as
the first, except that the value of a high level variable is changed. This means that no information
can leak about the value of that variable for any possible attacker behaviour, so proving our main
correctness results.
5.1 From rights to allowed devices
As a preliminary step, we need to formally define which devices are and are not granted permissions
by a particular set of rights. To do this we need a way to refer to particular devices while they
make reductions, so as a notational convention, we place identifiers on devices, that are preserved
through reductions. By convention an identifier will be an index on each device, so for example
D1 | D2 → D
′
1 | D
′
2 expresses that Di and D
′
i represent the same physical device in different states.
In Definition 1, Definition 2 and Definition 3 below, we formally define an association between
the public keys in a rights set and devices, but first we motivate these definitions with an example:
Example 6 Consider the the system SDA | SDB | MDM | MDN | RDX | RDY | SrvS
where SD,MD,RD and Srv are defined in Figure 11 and Figure 12 (i.e. there are two clones
of each devices of the system from Section 4, except for the server). Consider the variable data :
Int{pub(Server),client1 ,client2} of the RegisterUser command on Device S (the server). There are three
reasons for a device to be allowed to access shared data, depending on which reduction occurs in the
system.
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First, the devices that created the keys client1 and client2 are allowed access to this data. This
pair of keys is passed to the server at the start of its loop. Depending on which device (A or B)
made the connection to the server channel newUsers, client1 allows either Device A or Device B
(as client1 ). Assume that it is Device A. Similarly client2 represents Device X or Y depending on
which device connected to channel c during the Sender command of Device A. Assume it is Device
X.
Next, since the public key client1 has been created by the command newPrin Alice{mobile} in
Device A, the device which corresponds to the public key mobile is also allowed to access data. We
assume that it is Device M .
Thirdly, the public key pub(Server) has not been generated by any device. However it was in
the initial memory of Device S, therefore this device is also allowed to access the shared data by the
right granted by this key.
Our security property grants that no other device than Device S,A,X andM can get information
about the value of data. On the other hand, if an untyped attacker provides its own key to Device
A, through channel c, then no security guarantee can be provided about data. Indeed, such a case
means that the rights explicitly allows the attacker’s device to access the data as any other regular
device.
Before we formalise what are the allowed devices, we make reasonable assumption about the
initial process. For instance, when the process starts, we assume that devices have not already
established any channel between them. We also consider that they have an empty memory except
for some public keys and principals (and we do not allow duplicate principals). Finally, we consider
that all devices are well-typed except one (Device 0) which is the untyped attacker.
We first define a well-formed and well-typed condition on processes:
Definition 1 A valid initial process P = νc¯. 〈M0 ◮ C0〉0 | 〈M1 ◮ C1〉1 | . . . | 〈Mn ◮ Cn〉n is a
process where:
1. There is no active channel already established between the processes: c¯ = {}.
2. The bound values in memory are either principals or public keys: For all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, x 7→ w ∈
Mi implies there exists k
+, w = prin(k+, k−, {}) or w = k+.
3. Each principal exists only on one device: For all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j, prin(k+, k−, {}) ∈ Mi
implies prin(k+, k−, {}) /∈Mj .
4. The memory of every device is well-typed with contexts corresponding to its memory and
pc = ⊥: for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, w.l.o.g. assume that Mi = {p1 7→ prin(k1
+, k1
−, {}), . . . , pm 7→
prin(km
+, km
−, {}), pk1 7→ k
′
1
+, . . . pkp 7→ k
′
p
+}, we have ⊥; {p1, . . . , pn}; {pk1, . . . , pkp}; {}; {} ⊢
C for some command C.
Before defining the set of allowed devices, we define an auxiliary function that maintains which
devices are allowed to access shared data, and which public keys need to be associated to devices.
This auxiliary metafunction maps backward from a set of rights LR that confers access, to all
possible devices that may have provided the keys that gave them those rights. This is the set of
allowed devices Entitled(LR)T where T is a process trace, defined below. Any device that is not in
this set is not allowed by LR; we will consider such devices as attacker devices in our threat model.
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Definition 2 Given a reduction P → P ′ where devices identifiers are in {0, . . . , n}, given a sub-
set of identifiers I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a set of public keys LR, we define the backward function
BP→P ′(I,LR) in the following way.
• If P → P ′ is the reduction (newPrin S) on a device Di, i 6= 0 that creates a new principal
prin(k+, k−,LR′) and that k+ ∈ LR then
BP→P ′(I,LR) =
(
I ∪ {i},LR′ ∪ LR \ {k+}
)
.
• Otherwise BP→P ′(I,LR) = (I,LR).
Definition 3 Let P0 = 〈M0 ◮ C0〉0 | 〈M1 ◮ C1〉1 | . . . | 〈Mn ◮ Cn〉n a valid initial process. Let a
sequence of reductions T = P0 → P1 . . .→ Pn and let LR a set of public keys, we consider
(I0,LR0) = BP0→P1 ◦ . . . ◦ BPn−1→Pn(∅,LR).
Let I ′ = {i | ∃k+ ∈ LR0, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, prin(k
+, k−, {}) ∈Mi}. We define the set of allowed devices
identifiers Entitled(LR)T as Entitled(LR)T = I0 ∪ I
′.
Consider the set {k+ | k+ ∈ LR0 ∧ ∄i ∈ I ′, prin(k+, k−, {}) ∈Mi}. We say that Entitled(LR)T
is safe if this set is empty.
In other words, Entitled(LR)T is safe when all keys involved by LR have been either created
by devices of Entitled(LR)T or owned by them at the beginning. This implies, since valid ini-
tial processes don’t have duplicated keys, that the untyped attacker whose index cannot be in
Entitled(LR)T have not generated any of these keys.
5.2 Definition of the attacker and of the open process semantics
An attacker is a device A = 〈M ◮ C〉 where M is a standard memory and C is a command which
is not typed and which contains additional expressions to do realistic operations that an attacker
can perform like extracting k−, k+ and LR from prin(k+, k−,LR), decrypting a ciphertext with
only a secret key, or releasing a principal with arbitrary rights (encLR,n(prin(k
+, k−,LR′)) with
LR 6= LR′).However, the attacker is not able to create principals with a public key that does not
correspond to the private key because we assume that the validity of any pairs is checked when
received by an honest device. We denote such an extended expression using E.
To reason about any attacker, we introduce open processes in a similar way as in the applied pi-
calculus [1]. An open process has the syntax K |= νc¯. D1 | . . . | Dn where D1, . . . ,Dn are well-typed
devices (the indexes 1, . . . n are the tags of the devices: we do not change them through reductions),
where c¯ are the channels which have been established between devices D1, . . . ,Dn (not with the
attacker) and where K is a memory representing the values that the attacker already received. We
refer to D1, . . . ,Dn as the honest devices. We also refer to K as the attacker knowledge. This plays
the same role as frames in the applied pi-calculus, and also plays a similar role as computer memory
in the bisimulation that we use for reasoning about noninterference for nondeterministic programs.
We denote K(E) the evaluation of E with the memory K (to be defined the variables of E should
exists in K).
Our type system ensures that an attacker is never able to learn any of the secret keys belonging
to “honest” devices, as represented by the notion of reference rights defined below. The following
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predicate overapproximates what an attacker can learn about a value, based on the “knowledge”
represented by its memory K and on the assumption that it knows all keys which are not in LR
(which aims at being the reference rights).
Definition 4 Given a set of keys LR and a value v, we define the predicate K ⊢LR v as there exists
an extended expression E such that K(E) = v, where this extended expression contains all standard
functions and attacker functions, as well as an oracle function which provides the secret key of any
public key which is not in LR.
Open processes have two forms of reductions: internal reductions, which are the same as the
reductions for closed processes, and labeled reductions which are reductions involving the attacker.
Labels on these latter reductions represent the knowledge that an attacker can use to distinguish
between two traces, effectively the “low” information that is leaked from the system.
There are two forms of labelled reductions, both of which take the form P
l
−→ P ′. In the first
form, input reductions P
in((c)att ,E)
−−−−−−−→ P ′, the attacker provides data, and in the second form, output
reductions P
out((c)att,x)
−−−−−−−→ P ′, the attacker receives data from an honest device. There are also two
further forms of input reductions: those for establishing channels and those which send data. The
reduction that establishes a secure channel takes the form:
K|=νc¯.D |〈M◮accept c :Chan(SR1)R2from k as P ;C〉i
in((c)att ,(Chan(SR1 )R2 ,E,E
′))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
K |= νc¯.D | 〈M ◮ C{(c)att/c}〉i
where (c)att is any attacker channel name, K(E) should be the private key corresponding to M(k)
and K(E′) should be the public key of M(p). The reduction to establish a public channel is similar
but simpler. There is no need for checks on E or E′.
Note that, unlike standard connection establishment where a fresh channel name is added to
νc¯, here the name of the established channel is provided by the attacker and is not added in c¯,
which is out of the scope of the attacker. However the attacker has to provide channel names in
a separate subdomain which prevents it from using an existing honest channel name. The names
which are the attacker’s channel names are written (c)att. To summarize, a channel name of form
(c)att represents a channel which is established between a device and the attacker, a channel c ∈ c¯ is
a channel between two devices (not accessible from the attacker) and a channel name c /∈ c¯ and not
in the attacker’s channel domain is just a program variable representing a future channel. Finally,
we consider an implicit injection c 7→ (c)att from c¯ to attacker’s channels.
For input reductions that sends data on an established attacker channel, E is an expression
of the extended syntax admitting lower level operations that are available to attackers but not to
honest devices, as explained above. There is just one rule for output reduction, saying that an
attacker can learn from a value output on an attacker channel:
fresh(x) M1(e) = v
K |= νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | output (c)att〈e〉;C〉i
out((c)att,x)
−−−−−−−→ K ∪ (x 7→ v) |= νc¯.D | 〈M1 ◮ C
′ | C〉i
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Example 7 We consider the system consisting of MD | SD from Figure 12 running in parallel with
an untyped attacker A. The corresponding open process is initially {} |= SDA | MDM . Assume
that Device M (MDM ) reduces with the attacker instead of SDA, we have:
→ {} |= SDA | MD
′
M
in((c)att,ct)
−−−−−−−→ {} |= SDA | MD
′′
M
out((c)att,x)
−−−−−−−→ (x 7→ k+) |= SDA | MD
′′′
M
where ct = Chan(PubKey⊥)⊥ and Device M has memory Mobile
′ 7→ prin(k+, k−, {}) (a renaming
of the local variable Mobile on the device), after the first internal reduction where the principal is
created.
After the first reduction where MDM creates its principal, the attacker establish the connection
with Device M : as M is expecting a connection of type ct, the attacker have to provide ct and one
of its channel name (c)att. Next, Device M outputs the value of pub(Mobile) on (c)att which is then
stored on the attacker’s memory.
The following defines a subprocess of the “honest” devices of a system P , where some (other)
devices of that system may be attacker devices. This subprocess of honest devices will be those
defined by Entitled(LR)T . In other words, all devices which are not allowed by some key in LR are
assumed to be controlled by the attacker.
Definition 5 Given a process P = νc¯. D1 | . . . | Dn and {I1, . . . ,Im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let c¯
′ the
names of channels between devices of {I1, . . . ,Im} we define the subprocess of devices P ↾{I1,...,Im}=
νc¯′.D′I1 | . . . | D
′
Im
where D′i is Di where each channel name c ∈ c¯ \ c¯
′ have been replaced by an
attacker-channel name (c)att.
In the following, we will denote by P
l1,...,ln
====⇒ P ′ a sequence of reductions P → ∗P1
l1−→ P ′1 →
∗P2 . . . Pn
ln−→ P ′n →
∗P ′. We also denote by P
l?
−→ P ′ a reduction which is either P → P ′ or P
l′
−→ P ′
for some label l′ and by P
l?
−→ ?P ′ either P
l?
−→ P ′ or P = P ′.
The following proposition states that if there is an execution of a system that includes com-
munication with attacker devices, where all communication is local in this closed system, then we
can consider subsystem of this, omitting the attacker devices, where communications with attacker
devices are modelled by labelled reductions of the form described above. So the attacker devices
become part of the context that the devices in the subsystem interact with through a labelled
transition system. Such a subsystem may also exclude some of the “honest” devices in the original
system, and in that case we treat those excluded devices as attacker devices in the context (since
labels on the reductions only model communication with attackers).
Proposition 1 Let P = νc¯.A | D1 | . . . | Dn where all Di are well-typed and A is an untyped
device. If P → ∗νc¯′.P ′, then for all subset S of {1, . . . , n}, there exist l1, . . . , lm and K
′ (the
attacker knowledge at the end of the execution) such that
K |= P ↾S
l1,...,lm
=====⇒ K′ |= P ′ ↾S
where K is a memory which is the union of the memories of A and all Di with i /∈ S (variable
names are renamed whenever there is a name conflict).
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For instance, the system SDA | MSM | SD0, where SD0 is part of the attacker, can perform
three internal reductions between MSM and SD0 where MSM sends its public key to SD0. In
Example 7, we provided the three reductions of the system ({} |= SDA | MSM | SD0)↾{A,M}.
5.3 Extended syntax with extra annotations
In this section, we add extra annotations to processes to perform a specific analysis about a given
right LR = {pk1, . . . , pkn}. Since the keys in LR do not necessary exist in the initial process,
we first annotate open processes with a reference right Rr with the intention that this right will
eventually grow to the right LR as keys are generated and added to this right during execution.
Given a reference right Rr, we define any rights whose all keys are in Rr to be high (by opposition
to low). The set Rr starts with keys that exists in the initial process.
An annotated process has the syntax
K; Rr |= P
for attacker knowledge K, reference right Rr and process P . The exact form of the annotations is ex-
plained below. The reference right Rr only changes during a reduction of a command newPrin pRS .
In this case, there is a choice of whether or not to include the generated public key in Rr.
Definition 6 A sequence of reductions is called standard if each time a (newPrin S) reduction
adds a key to Rr:
K; Rr |= νc¯.〈M ◮ newPrin pRS ;C〉 | P
→ K; Rr ∪ {k
+} |= νc¯.〈M ∪ p 7→ prin(k+, k−,LR) ◮ C〉 | P
we have LR ⊆ Rr.
The next proposition ensures the existence of a standard annotation such that the rights we
want to consider at the end are high and that the attacker does know any key in the set Rr of the
initial process. We will state in Proposition 3 that this implies that the attacker never knows the
keys in Rr during the whole reduction.
Proposition 2 Let P be a valid initial process such that P →∗P ′ and let LR a set of keys defined
in P ′. If DH = Entitled(LR)P→∗P ′ is safe then there exists a standard annotation for the reduction
provided by Proposition 1: K0; Rr0 |= P ↾DH
l1,...,ln
====⇒ K; Rr |= P
′ ↾DH where Rr0 and Rr are such that
∀k+ ∈ Rr0, K0 0Rr0 k
− and LR ⊆ Rr.
When a variable or a channel is created with some rights, the reduction rules of the operational
semantics remove all information about those rights. Therefore we add annotations to devices to
remember if the defined right was high or low, according to Rr. Recall that a right is high if it
contains a key in the reference right Rr. We use ℓ as a metavariable for an annotation H or L.
1. A memory location x 7→ v ∈ M which is created by a command new x : SR = e;C, where
R evaluates in M to a high right according to Rr, is annotated as a high location: x
H 7→ v.
Otherwise x is annotated as a low location: xL 7→ v. By convention K contains only low
locations.
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2. A new channel name c, which is created by a command that establishes a channel c :
Chan(SR1)R2 , is annotated as c
ℓ1
ℓ2
where ℓ1 resp. ℓ2 is H if the evaluation of R1 (resp. R2) is
high, and is annotated as L otherwise.
3. A value which is the result of an expression (besides an encryption expression) where one
variable refers to a high location is annotated as a high value (v)H. Otherwise, it is annotated
as a low value (v)L. When a value (v)ℓ is encrypted, it becomes (encRS,n((v)
ℓ))L i.e., the
initial tag is associated to the subterm.
4. A device 〈M ◮ C1 | . . . | Cn〉 is annotated as 〈M ◮ (C1)(ℓ1) | . . . | (Cn)(ℓn)〉i. There is
one tag ℓi ∈ {L,H} for each sub-command Ci which can be reduced. The annotation of
each thread (Ci)(ℓi) records whether the existence of this thread was due to a high value or
a high right. When ℓi = H, we say that the thread is high, otherwise the thread is low. For
instance, the annotated device 〈aH 7→ (1)H ◮ (if (a = 0) then C1 else C2)(L)〉1 reduces to
〈aH 7→ 1 ◮ (C2)(H)〉1 because a is a high location. The other case where a thread can be set
to high is in the establishment of a secure channel that is annotated with cH(H).
These annotations allow us to define technical invariants that are preserved during reduction.
In the following technical definition, we formalize the idea that there exist a typing judgment for
devices (Case (1) below) which is consistent with the annotations:
1. Variables (Case (2)) and channels (Case (3)) should have a type which corresponds to their
annotation
2. The type system tracks a notion of security level for the control flow, and this level pc must
be consistent with the thread annotation (Case (4)).
3. In addition, we express that the devices are not in a corrupted configuration, in the sense
that secure channels are not being used to communicate with the attacker (Case (5)), nor are
they used in a low thread (Case (6)).
4. Finally, ciphers for values (Case (7)) and principals (Case (8)) should not have high contents
protected by low keys.
Definition 7 A tuple consisting of a reference right Rr, a memory M and a thread (C)(ℓ) is well-
annotated written “ Rr  M ⊲ (C)(ℓ) : well-annotated” if there exists pc, Γp, Γk, Γc and Γ such
that
1. pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
2. For all locations x in M , we have
• either xL 7→ (v)L in M for some value v and x ∈ Γp ∪ Γk
• or Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x : SR and
– if Rr ⊇M(R), x
H 7→ (v)H in M ,
– if Rr )M(R), xL 7→ (v)L in M for some value v.
3. For all channels c in the thread such that Γc ⊢ c : Chan(SR1)R2 , the annotation of c is c
ℓ2
(ℓ1)
where ℓ2 = H iff. Rr ⊇ R2, ℓ1 = H iff. Rr ⊇M(R1).
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4. Rr ⊇ pc if and only if ℓ = H.
5. For all (c)att, we have Γc ⊢ (c)att : Chan(SR1)R2 with Rr )M(R2) and Rr )M(R1).
6. if ℓ is L, then there is no cH(H) in C.
7. For all values v stored in memory, if a sub-term of v matches encLR,n((t)
H) then Rr ⊇ LR.
8. For all values v in memory, if a sub-term of v matches encLR′,n(prin(k,LR, )) then LR = LR
′
or Rr ⊇ LR.
When, for a device D = 〈M ◮ (C1)(ℓ1) | . . . | (Cn)(ℓn)〉i and a set Rr, we have Rr  M ⊲
(Ci)(ℓi) : well-annotated for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then we use the notation Rr  D : well-annotated.
Finally, we get the following subject-reduction result:
Proposition 3 Let K; Rr |= νc¯.D1 | . . . | Dn an open process such that for all k
+ ∈ Rr we have
K 0Rr k
− and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Rr  Di : well-annotated. If K; Rr |= νc¯.D1 | . . . | Dn
l?
−→
K′; Rr
′ |= νc¯′.D′1 | . . . | D
′
n then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Rr  D
′
i : well-annotated. Moreover if the
reduction is standard, we have K′ 0Rr ′ k
− for all k+ ∈ Rr
′.
Finally, valid initial processes which only require each device to be well-typed are well-annotated.
Proposition 4 Given a valid initial process P =
(
K |= 〈M1 ◮ C1〉1| . . . |〈Mn ◮ Cn〉n
)
, We have
Rr Mi ⊲ (Ci)(L) : well-annotated for 1 ≤ i ≤ n for any Rr.
5.4 Labelled bisimilarity
The invariants expressed above are about a single process. To ensure that the attacker cannot track
implicit flows, we need to compare the execution of two processes in parallel. In this section, we
define a relation between processes which implies an adapted version of the bisimilarity property
of the applied pi-calculus [1].
The two processes that we compare are the actual process and another one where the value of
one of the high variables of the memory of some device has been changed to another one. So first,
we define what is a process where a variable is modified arbitrarily.
Definition 8 Given a device D = 〈M ∪ {x 7→ v′} ◮ C〉, and a value v, we define Dx=v to be the
device that updates the variable x to be v by assignment, 〈M∪{x 7→ v′} ◮ C | x := v; 〉. Extending
this from devices to processes, given a process P which contains D with index i, we define Pi:x=v
to be the same process except that D has been replaced by Dx=v.
In contrast to systems where the attacker can only observe public values in memory after
reduction, here we model that the attacker can observe communications on channels that have
been established with other devices. In the following examples, we stress how an attacker can
distinguish between two processes even without knowing actual confidential values in the memory
of those devices.
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Example 8 We consider the device D(X,Y ), where the description is parametrized by two meta-
variables: X is a value stored in memory and Y is a value that is encrypted and sent on an attacker
channel. The device has a memory M(X) = {x 7→ X, k 7→ k0
+}, and the full description of the
device is
〈M(X) ◮ if x = 0 then output (c)att〈enck(Y )〉〉A.
The process D(0, Y ) can be distinguished from the process D(1, Y ). In the first case, we have:
{} |= D(0, Y )
out((c)att,m)
−−−−−−−−→
{m 7→ enck(Y )} |= 〈M(X) ◮ skip 〉A
On the other hand, there is no reduction with only the label out((c)att,m) and internal reductions
starting from {} |= D(1, Y ). This distinction models the fact that if the attacker receives data on
(c)att, it learns that X = 0.
The processes D(0, 2) and D(0, 3) can also be distinguished even if both {k 7→ k0
−} |= D(0, 2)
and {k 7→ k0
−} |= D(0, 3) can reduce with a label out((c)att,m). Indeed, after reduction the at-
tacker’s knowledge is K = {k 7→ k0
−,m 7→ enck0+,n(Y )} where Y is 2 (resp. 3): By performing
the decryption of m with an untyped decryption, the attacker can compare the result to 2, and
K(decrk(m)) = 2 is only true in the first case.
Finally, the processes {} |= D(0, 2) and {} |= D(0, 3) are not distinguishable. In both cases:
• there is no test to distinguish between the two attacker’s knowledge, and
• the labelled reductions are the same i.e out((c)att,m)
With these examples in mind, we introduce static equivalence, an adaptation of the one used
in the applied pi-calculus, which expresses that it is not possible to test some equality which would
work with one memory but not with the other.
Definition 9 We say that two memories M1 and M2 are statically equivalent (≈s) if they have
exactly the same variable names and for all extended expressions E where its variables x1, . . . , xn ∈
M1, we have M1(E) =M2(E).
Finally, we define an adaptation of the labelled bisimilarity. This recursive definition generalizes
the conclusion of the example: the two memories should be statically equivalent, and a transition
in one process can be mimicked in the other process, where the reduced processes should also be
bisimilar.
Definition 10 Labeled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relation R on open processes such
that (KA |= PA) R (KB |= PB) implies:
1. KA ≈s K
B;
2. if (KA |= PA) → (KA
′
|= PA
′
), then (KB |= PB) → ∗(KB
′
|= PB
′
) and (KA
′
|= PA
′
) R
(KB
′
|= PB
′
) for some KB
′
|= PB
′
;
3. if (KA |= PA)
l
−→ (KA
′
|= PA
′
), then (KB |= (KB |= PB)
l
=⇒ (KB
′
|= PB
′
) and (KA
′
|=
PA
′
) R (KB
′
|= PB
′
) for some KB
′
|= PB
′
.
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The labelled bisimilarity is a strong equivalence property, and its we use it to state the security
property that an attacker is unable to distinguish between two processes in the same class [2].
However this definition does not help to actually compute the processes in the same class. Therefore
we define a stronger relation that can be defined from our annotated semantics.
First, we define an obfuscation function obf(LR, w) which takes a set of public key LR and a
value or a principal w and returns an obfuscated value (its syntax is like the syntax of value except
that there is an additional option  and that a principal value is also an option).
Definition 11 Let LR a set of public key, w a principal p or a value v. We define obf(LR, w)
depending on the structure of w.
obf(LR, encLR′,n(w
′))=
{
encLR′,n(obf(LR, w
′)) if LR ) LR′
encLR′,n() if LR ⊇ LR
′
obf(LR, {v1, . . . , vn}) ={obf(LR, v1), . . . , obf(LR, vn)}
otherwise obf(LR, w) =w.
where w′ is a value or a principal and n a nonce.
The set LR aims at containing a set of keys whose private keys will never be known by the
attacker. In our previous example, we have obf(k0
+, enck0+,n(Y )) = enck0+,n(): if k0
− is never
known by the attacker, the attacker will never be able to know anything about Y . Note that the
random seed n used for the cipher is not hidden. Indeed, the attacker is able to distinguish between
a cipher that is sent twice and two values which are encrypted then sent: in the first case the two
message are strictly identical.
We now define an equivalence on memories: given a reference right Rr, a set of safe keys, then
we say that two memories are equivalent if they differ only by the high values which aims at never
been sent to the attacker and by the obfuscated terms of the low values.
Definition 12 (equivalent memories) Equivalent memory is a relation on memories such that
M1 RRr M2 if for each low location x
L 7→ vA in M1 (resp. M2), there exists x
L 7→ vB in M2 (resp.
M1) such that obf(Rr, v
A) = obf(Rr, v
B) and each location p 7→ pv in M1 (resp. M2) exists in M2
(resp. M1).
Next, we define an equivalence relation between two well-annotated processes: two processes are
equivalent if they have the same commands up to some additional high threads and have equivalent
memories:
Definition 13 Two annotated processes PA and PB are annotated-equivalent (PA R PB) when
there exists an alpha-renaming (capture-avoiding renaming of bound variables) of PB such that
PA is KA; Rr |= νc¯.〈M
A
1 ◮ C
A
(1,1) | . . . | C
A
(1,m1)
〉1|
. . . |〈MAn ◮ C
A
(n,1) | . . . | C
A
(n,mn)
〉n,
PB is KB ; Rr |= νc¯
′.〈MB1 ◮ C
B
(1,1) | . . . | C
B
(1,m1)
〉1|
. . . |〈MBn ◮ C
B
(n,1) | . . . | C
B
(n,mn)
〉n,
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and we have KA RRr K
B, for all k+ ∈ Rr, we have K
A 0Rr k
− and furthermore for all (i, j), first
MAi RRr M
B
i , next, the annotation on each thread C
X
(i,j) (where X stands for A or B) is either H
or L such that either:
• Rr M
X
i ⊲ (C
X
(i,j))(H) : well-annotated
• Rr  M
X
i ⊲ (C
X
(i,j))(L) : well-annotated and C
A
(i,j) = C
B
(i,j) (the commands are syntactically
identical up to renaming of bound variables).
Finally, we prove that this relation actually implies bisimilarity.
Proposition 5 Let PA be (KA; Rr |= νc¯.Q
A) and PB be (KB ; Rr |= νc¯
′.QB), where both are well-
annotated processes such that PA R PB, Furthermore assume that for all k+ ∈ Rr we have K
A 0Rr
k−. Then the processes are annotated equivalent, PA ≈l P
B (with the annotations removed).
5.5 Main theorems
Our first security property grants confidentiality for each created variable in the following way.
When a variable x is created with a protection R, this implicitly defines a set of devices which
are allowed to access x. If the untyped attacker is not in this set, then any collaboration of the
attacker with the denied-access devices can not learn any information about the value stored by
the variable: they cannot detect an arbitrary modification of the variable.
Theorem 1 Let P = A | D1 | . . . | Dn be a valid initial process. We consider a reduction P →
∗P ′
with P ′ = νc¯.A′ | D′1 | . . . | D
′
n such that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D
′
i is 〈M ◮ new x :SR = E;C | C
′〉.
Let LR = M(R) be the set of keys corresponding to R, let DH = Entitled(LR)P→P ′ and let K be
the unions of memories of the devices of P ′ whose indexes are not in DH and of device A
′. If DH
is safe (as stated in Definition 3), then (K |= P ′ ↾DH ) ≈l (K |= P
′
i:x=v ↾DH ).
Proof. According to Proposition 1, we have K0 |= P ↾DH
l1,...,ln
====⇒
∗
K′ |= P ′ ↾DH where K0 =⋃
i/∈DH
Mi. As P is a valid initial process, we get that P ↾DH is also a valid initial process (the
verification of all conditions to be a valid initial process is immediate). Since DH is safe, we consider
Rr0, Rr and the standard annotated semantics from Proposition 2:
K0; Rr0 |= P ↾DH
l1,...,ln
====⇒ K; Rr |= P
′ ↾DH
where LR ⊆ Rr and
∀k+ ∈ Rr0, K0 0Rr0 k
−. (1)
From Proposition 4, the annotation of the initial process is well-annotated. From Proposition 3 on
this annotation, we get for all i ∈ DH : Rr  Di : well-annotated and, due to (1), for all k
+ ∈ Rr we
have K 0Rr k
−. Since LR ⊆ Rr, and given the (assign T) rule, we also have
Rr M ∪ {x
H 7→ v′} ⊲ (x := v)(H) : well-annotated.
Therefore, we satisfy all conditions of Definition 13:
(K; Rr |= P
′) R (K; Rr |= P
′
i:x=v).
Finally, we conclude with Proposition 5.
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Example 9 From the example of Section 4, let consider the variable
sharedSecret : Int{serverKey,Alice,Bob} of the device SD. The Theorem 1 states that only devices
from Entitled({serverKey ,Alice,Bob})System→System′ can distinguish between sharedSecret = 42 or
sharedSecret = 43. Whatever are the reductions, these devices contains for sure Srv since its key
is known from the beginning and SD since it creates Alice. The only threat is that the channel
otherPrin has not been established with MD or that c has not been established with the device RD
of Bob. These threats could be removed by an additional authentication protocol or the use of a
private channel (for instance if the connection between SD and MD is a direct wired connection).
This means that not knowing which code is run on Srv and RD is not a threat as long as Srv and
RD guarantee that their codes are well-typed.
Finally, we state a standard security property in the simpler case where there is no untyped
attacker. Given a process P , if, at some point, we change the value that a variable is bound to in
memory, where that variable has been typed with right R, then new reductions will not alter values
in memory locations that have been typed strictly less confidential than R (i.e., those variables
have rights that contain public keys not contained in R).
Theorem 2 Let P be a valid initial process. We consider a reduction P → P ′ with P ′ = D′1| . . . |D
′
n
such that for some i, D′i is 〈M ◮ new x : SR = E;C | C
′〉. Let v be any value of type S. Let
P ′′ = D′′1 | . . . |D
′′
n such that P
′ → ∗P ′′ then there exists Q′′ such that P ′x=v →
∗Q′′ where for all
memory location y that have been created in any device with rights Rl with R ) Rl, we have
obf(R, vP ) = obf(R, v
′
Q) where vP is the value of y in P
′′ and vQ the value of y in Q
′′.
Implementation: We have implemented an interpreter for this language in Ocaml2. The
program strictly follows the extended semantics, it has commands to add a new device; to do
an internal reduction on the selected thread(s) of the selected device(s); to perform an attacker
communication, and to type-check each device of the system according to the annotations. To
define a device which starts with keys in memory, two additional commands are provided which are
allowed only as a preamble: load principal p from i; and load x : PubKey from i; where i is a
number; an identical i on two devices represents a shared key. This implementation demonstrates
that the syntax is well-defined and effective, and allows us to test the invariance of the properties
with demonstrative examples. The example of Section 4 has been tested using this implementation:
we are able to reduce the process such that Bob gets the secret from Alice and we can verify that
each step correctly type-checks.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a security type system that provides location based correctness results as well
as a more traditional non-interference result. The key novelty of our system is to allow principal
identities to be created and shared across devices in a controlled way, without the need for a global
PKI or middleware layer. Hence, our correctness result states that well-typed devices can control
which other devices may acquire their data, even in the presents of untyped attackers. We have
illustrated our system with an example of an open cloud server that accepts new users. This server
does perform some monitoring of its users but our type system proves that it does not monitor the
2https://github.com/gazeaui/secure-type-for-cloud
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content of their data. We argued that our framework is particularly appropriate to cloud systems
where organizations will want guarantees about where their data will be stored as well as the secrecy
of their data.
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A Additional Language Rules
Reduction is defined modulo the standard equivalence rules, which may be applied in any context,
e.g.
D1 | D2 ≡ D2 | D1
D1 | (D2 | D2) ≡ (D1 | D2) | D2
〈M1 ◮ C1 | C2〉 ≡ 〈M1 ◮ C2 | C1〉
〈M1 ◮ C1 | (C2 | C3)〉 ≡ 〈M1 ◮ (C1 | C2) | C2〉
The rules not mentioned in Figure 6 can be found in Figure 15 and the types rules not mentioned
in Figure 8 and Figure 9 can be found in Figure 13 and Figure 13.
B Proofs of correctness
Here we provide the proof of all propositions of Section 5.
B.1 From rights to allowed devices
No proposition in this section.
B.2 Definition of the attacker and of the open process semantics
Proposition 1 Let P = νc¯.A | D1 | . . . | Dn where all Di are well-typed and A is an untyped
device. If P → ∗νc¯′.P ′, then for all subset S of {1, . . . , n}, there exist l1, . . . , lm and K
′ (the
attacker knowledge at the end of the execution) such that
K |= P ↾S
l1,...,lm
=====⇒ K′ |= P ′ ↾S
where K is a memory which is the union of the memories of A and all Di with i /∈ S (variable
names are renamed whenever there is a name conflict).
Proof. By induction on the number of reduction steps. We assume that the result is true for
n− 1 reductions i.e we have P | A→∗P ′ | A′ which is mimicked by
K |= P ↾S
l1,...,lm
−−−−→ K′ |= P ′a ↾S
and we prove that if P ′ | A′ → P ′′ | A′′ then we can also have
K |= P ′a ↾S
l?
−→ K′ |= P ′′a ↾S .
1. If the last reduction involves devices which are part of S, then this same reduction can be
done on P ′a ↾S.
2. If the last reduction involves devices which are not part of S then no reduction has to be done
in the open semantics.
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v :T ∈ Γ
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ v : T
(var T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ i : Int⊥
(int T)
P ∈ Γp
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ pub(P ) : PubKey⊥
(pubKey T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e1 :IntR1 Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e2 :IntR2
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e1 + e2 : IntR1∩R2
(Sum T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ v1 :SR . . .Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ vn :SR
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ {v1, . . . vn} : Array{S}R
(array T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x :Array{S}R1 Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e :IntR2
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x[e] :SR1∩R2
(element T)
Γp; Γk ⊢ ⊥
(public T)
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C1 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C2
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C1 | C2
(para T)
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ skip
(skip T)
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ ! C
(bang T)
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e1 : IntR1 Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e2 : SR2
Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x : Array{S}R3 γ ⊢ R3 ⊆ pc ∩R1 ∩R2 pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ x[e1] := e2; C
(assign array T)
pc = ⊥ pc; Γp; Γk; Γc ∪ {c :Chan(S⊥)⊥}; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ accept c :Chan(S⊥)⊥; C
(accept 1 T)
p ∈ Γp k ∈ Γk {pub(p), k} ⊆ R1 ⊆ R2 ⊆ pc R2; Γp; Γk; Γc ∪ {c : Chan(SR1)R2}; Γ ⊢ C
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ accept c :Chan(SR1)R2 from k as p; C
(accept 2 T)
Figure 13: Other type rules for commands
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pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ G{C/skip}
pc; Γp; Γk; Γc; Γ ⊢ synchronized{G};C
(sync T)
Where
G ::= if(e1 = e2) then G1 else G2
| new x :SR = e; G
| x := e; G
| x[e1] := e2; G
| decryptP e as x :SR then G1 else G2
| registerP1 e as P2 then G1 else G2
| G1 | G2
| skip
Figure 14: Other type rules for commands (continued)
3. If the last reduction νc¯.c.P | A → P1 | A1 is (i/o S) from outside S to S transferring v on
c then the labeled reduction K |= νc¯.P{(c)att/c}
in((c)att,v)
−−−−−−→ K |= νc¯.P1{(c)att/c} is possible
since v has been produced from values into memory not in S and the attacker can derive all
these values.
4. If the last reduction is a channel establishment between a device from S and a one not from
S, the proof is similar. Note that the new channel name is annotated with (c)att instead of c.
5. If the last reduction νc¯.c.P | A → P1 | A1 is (i/o S) from S to outside S transferring v on c
then the labeled reduction K |= νc¯.P
out(c,v)
−−−−−→ K ∪ v |= νc¯.P1 exists and we still have for all v
′
in memory of a device of P which identifier is not in S, K ∪ v ⊢ v′.
B.3 Extended syntax with extra annotations
Proposition 2 Let P be a valid initial process such that P →∗P ′ and let LR a set of keys defined
in P ′. If DH = Entitled(LR)P→∗P ′ is safe then there exists a standard annotation for the reduction
provided by Proposition 1: K0; Rr0 |= P ↾DH
l1,...,ln
====⇒ K; Rr |= P
′ ↾DH where Rr0 and Rr are such that
∀k+ ∈ Rr0, K0 0Rr0 k
− and LR ⊆ Rr.
Proof. We assume that P ′ is the n-th reduction of P . We denote by Pm, P after m reductions.
Let (Ii,LRi) = BP→P1(Ii+1,LRi+1) for 0 ≤ i < n and (In,LRn) = (∅,LR).
We now prove by induction on the number of reduction steps that the annotation K0; Rr0 |=
P ↾DH
l1,...,lm
=====⇒ Km; Rrm |= P
′
m ↾DH such that Rrm =
⋃
0≤k≤m LRi is standard.
Note that as the set is safe, we have ∀k+ ∈ Rr0, K0 0Rr0 k
−. Moreover we also LR ⊆ Rrn by
definition.
LRm ⊆ Rrm where LRm contains all the keys of LR which have already been created.
The only reduction we need to consider are the one which might not be standard i.e. when a
reduction which creates a new principal pv = prin(k+, k−, {k1, . . . , kn}) where k is in
⋃
0≤k≤m LRi.
However, by design of the B function, we have {k1, . . . , kn} ∈ Rrm−1: the reduction is standard.
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M(e) = i i ∈ {0, . . . , n} M(x) = {v0, . . . , vi, . . . , vn}
M(x[e]) = vi
(element E)
M(e) = i i /∈ {0, . . . , n} M(x) = {v0, . . . , vi, . . . , vn}
M(x[e]) = NaV
(element err E)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, R)
M(pub(P )) = k+
(pub E)
〈M ◮ C1〉 →
∗ 〈M ′ ◮ skip〉
〈M ◮ synchronized{C1};C2〉 → 〈M
′ ◮ C2〉
(sync S)
M(e1) = v M(e2) = v
〈M ◮ if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2〉 → 〈M ◮ C1〉
(if1 S)
M(e1) = v M(e2) = v
′ v 6= v′
〈M ◮ if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2〉 → 〈M ◮ C2〉
(if2 S)
〈M ◮ ! C〉 → 〈M ◮ C | ! C〉
(bang S)
M(e1) = i M(e2) = v
〈M ∪ {x 7→ {v1, . . . vi, . . . vn} ◮ x[e1] := e2; C〉 → 〈M ∪ {x 7→ {v1, . . . v, . . . vn}} ◮ C〉
(assignArray S)
M(p) = prin(k+, k−,LR2) M(e) = encLR,n(v) k
+ 6∈M(RS1) ∨M(RS1) 6⊆ LR
〈M ◮ decryptp e as x :SRS1 then C1 else C2〉 → 〈M ◮ C2〉
(dec false S)
Figure 15: Other semantics rules
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E ::= m1 a variable of K
| encrE2(E1) encrypt E1 with rights E2
| decrE1(E2) decrypt E1 with the secret key E2
| alter(E1, E2) the principal E1 where its rights are now E2
| freshprin(E) the E-th principal generated by the attacker
| pub(E) the public key of a principal E
| sec(E) the secret key of a principal E
| rights(E) the rights of a principal E
| {E1, . . . En} tuple
| E1[E2] element of a tuple
| E1 ⊕ E2 where ⊕ is +,−,×, . . .
| i an integer
M(E1) = v M(E2) = {k1
+, . . . , kn
+} fresh(n)
M(encrE2(E1)) = enc{k1+,...,kn+},n(v)
(attacker encryption)
M(E1) = enc{k1+,...,kn+},n(v) M(E2) = ki
− i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
M(decrE2(E1)) = v
(attacker decryption)
M(E1) = prin(k
+, k−, r) M(E2) = r
′
M(alter(E1, E2)) = prin(k
+, k−, r)
(attacker alter)
M(E) = i ∈ N
M(freshprin(E)) = prin(ki
+, ki
−, {})
(attacker fresh)
Figure 16: extended expressions of the attacker and some of their reduction rules.
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In the following auxiliary lemma, we state that low expressions reduces to low values while high
expressions reduces to high values.
Lemma 1 Let e and M be such that the sub-expressions ei : Ri of e are such that M(ei) = (vi)
ℓi
with xi = H iff. Rr ⊇ Ri. Let (v)
ℓ such that M(e) = (v)ℓ. We have: e : SR with Rr ⊇ R iff ℓ = H.
Proof. If Rr ⊇ R, we consider all constructors:
1. e = a+ b. If e : SR with Rr ⊇ R, due to the typing rule a or b has type IntR′ with Rr ⊇ R
′, by
the induction hypothesis, one of them reduced to a high value and the reduction rule states
that the result has to be high. If e : SR with Rr ) R due to the typing rule both a and b
has type Rr ) R′, by hypothesis both of them reduce to a low value, the reduction rule states
that the result will not be low.
2. e = x[e′]. If e : SR with Rr ⊇ R, due to the typing rule element T x or e
′ has type with label
Rr ⊇ R
′, by the induction hypothesis, one of them reduced to a high value and the reduction
rule states that the result has to be high. If e : SR with Rr ) R, due to the typing rule both
x and e′ has type Rr ) R′, by hypothesis both of them reduce to a low value, the reduction
rule states that the result will be low.
3. e = encR(e1). According to enc T, we have e : S⊥ and reduces to a low value (since the new
root is low).
4. e = release(P ), according to release T, e : secKey⊥ and reduces to a low value.
5. e = pub(P ), according to pubKey T, e : kpub⊥ and reduces a low value.
Lemma 2 Let Rr, C,M, y such that Rr  y ⊲ (C)(M) : well-annotated for some Γ and where C is a
command with an expression e such that Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ e : SR. We have that Rr ⊇ R iff. M(e) = (v)
H
for some value v.
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. If e is a variable, we conclude from Item 2 of
Definition 7. For the inductive case, we use Lemma 1 to conclude.
Proposition 3 Let K; Rr |= νc¯.D1 | . . . | Dn an open process such that for all k
+ ∈ Rr we have
K 0Rr k
− and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Rr  Di : well-annotated. If K; Rr |= νc¯.D1 | . . . | Dn
l?
−→
K′; Rr
′ |= νc¯′.D′1 | . . . | D
′
n then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Rr  D
′
i : well-annotated. Moreover if the
reduction is standard, we have K′ 0Rr ′ k
− for all k+ ∈ Rr
′.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we consider that the reduction is done on D1 (eventually D1 and D2 if it
is a communication between two device). We write D1 = 〈M1 ◮ (C1)(x) | . . . | (Cn)(xn)〉 and
D′1 = 〈M
′
1 ◮ (C
′
1)(x′) | . . . | (C
′
n)(xn)〉. Let Γpi, Γki, Γi and pci such that Rr  Mi ⊲ (Ci)(xi) :
well-annotated. We prove all the conditions of well-annotated separately.
1. C ′i is well-typed for some pc
′
i,Γ
′
i
By hypothesis, we know that Ci is well-typed for some Γpi, Γki, pci,Γi. If Ci := C | C
′ then
the two new threads after reduction are well-typed with Γpi, Γki, Γi and pci due to (para T).
If Ci :=!C then the two new threads are also well-typed due to (bang T). Otherwise, the
form of Ci is c;C
′
i (up to name renaming) or cond(c) then Ca else Cb where Ca or Cb is an
renaming of C ′i. All the corresponding type rules enforces that Ci is well-typed only if C
′
i is
well-typed.
39
2. For all location x in M , we have
• either xL 7→ (v)L in M for some value v and x ∈ Γp ∪ Γk
• or Γp; Γk; Γ ⊢ x : SR and
– if Rr ⊇M(R), x
H 7→ (v)H in M ,
– if Rr )M(R), xL 7→ (v)L in M for some value v.
First, we consider the annotation of variables. Once a memory location is created, there is
no reduction rule to change its type (low or high), Rr never becomes more confidential (Rr
increases only with new fresh keys) and all types rules enforce that the reduced command
C ′ can be typed with a context which preserves rights for all variables. For these reasons, if
the property holds when a variable is created, it holds forever. During creation, by design
of the annotated rules, the location is created as high or low only depending on if Rr ⊇ R
for regular variable and is always low when the location contains a principal or a key. For
inputs, since the input command does not specify the type, we look at the annotation of the
channel, which is itself defined from the condition Rr ⊇ R1 in the annotated semantic rules
about channel creation (high open priv), (low thread/high value open priv), (low open priv)
for channel opening with the attacker, from the fact that K 0Rr k
− for all k+ ∈ Rr we know
that the channel has a type for values less confidential than Rr.
For the annotation of values, we need to check that no high values are stored into low memory
(the annotation always produces high values from high memory). The reductions which set
new values to low memory locations are the following: (low assign), (low new), (deref S),
(low dec true), (low i/o) and (att. input). For the first rules ((low assign), (low new) ), the
stored value is the evaluation of an expression E. Since the type rules associated to these
commands enforces E to be of a type R such that Rr ⊇ R, according to Lemma 2, E reduces
to a low term. The argument is the same for (deref S).
For the internal communication (low i/o), the argument is the same except that the type
judgment of E is on the other device. For the input from the attacker att. input, the rule set
that attacker’s inputs are low.
For rule (low dec true) where one layer of encryption is removed, we have to ensure that the
decrypted value is low. The typing rule requires that Rr ) R1 and R2 ⊇ R1 which implies
Rr ) R2. From Item 7, we conclude.
The rule (high thread/low var dec true) can never be applied. Indeed, if the cipher is high,
from Lemma 2, the cipher has a high type, then the typing rule enforce the program counter
to be high which means the thread has to be high.
4. Rr ⊇ pc if and only if y = H.
First note that all types rules of commands requires that their continuation can be typed
with the same program counter. The interesting cases are when the type rules requires the
continuation to be typed with a more restrictive program counter and, for the other direction
of the equivalence, when the reduction rules reduces a low thread into a high thread.
• Conditional is typed with (if T): the program counter pc′ of the continuation if set to
Rr ⊇ pc
′ when at least one of the expressions is more confidential than Rr (we assume
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that initially Rr ) pc). According to Lemma 2, one of the expression reduces to a high
value. In this case, the reductions rules (high if true) and (high if false) sets the thread
to high. Reciprocally, if the thread is set to high, on of the value is high and according
to Lemma 2 the type of the continuation is Rr ⊇ pc
′.
• Secure channel opening is typed with (connect 2 T) and (accept 2 T). Both type rules
requires the continuation to have a program counter pc′ set such that Rr ⊇ pc
′ iff Rr ⊇ R2
where R2 is the right to see the channel. The reduction rule (high open priv) can be
applied only when R2 and R
′
2, the rights to see the channel of both threads are equal
and sets both threads to high exactly with the same condition.
• Decryption is typed with (dec T), the program counter pc′ of the continuation if set to
Rr ⊇ pc
′ when the expression to decrypt has rights R with Rr ⊇ R. This coincides with
the reductions rules (high dec true), (high thread/low var dec true),(high dec false) where
the thread becomes high iff the decrypted value is high (due to Lemma 2).
3. For all c in the thread such that Γ ⊢ c : Chan(SR1)R2 , the annotation of c is c
z
(z′)
where z = H iff. Rr ⊇ R2, z
′ = H iff. Rr ⊇ R1.
The annotation on channel is definitively fixed once it is created. The channel establishment
rules (high open priv), (low thread/high value open priv), (low thread/high value open priv)
and (low open priv) all enforce this property in their premisses. Public channels have type ⊥
and are annotated with c−L .
5 For all (c)att, we have Γ ⊢ (c)att : Chan(SR1)R2 with Rr ) R2 and Rr ) R1.
The interesting case is the creation of a new channel with the attacker. This can be done
through rules (att. open server) and (att. open priv client). By hypothesis, the attacker does
not know any key in Rr so it can only provides a secret key k
− not in Rr. Due to (connect 2 T)
or (accept 2 T), R1 and R2 should contains k
+. Therefore neither R1 or R2 is a subset of Rr,
which means Rr ) R2 and Rr ⊇ R1 as γ is required to be empty.
6 If y is L, then there is no cH(H) in C.
This is true before reduction. Since establishing a new channel cH(H) set the thread to high,
the property is also true after reduction.
7 For all x in memory, if a sub-term of x is encRS,n((t)
H) then Rr ⊇ RS.
The encryption typing rule for E = encR(E1), (dec T), requires that E1 : R1 is such that
R1 ⊇ R. From Lemma 2, we have M(E1) = (v)
H implies Rr ⊇ R1 and therefore Rr ⊇ R
which allows to conclude.
8 For all x in memory, if a sub-term of xmatches encLR′,n(prin(k,LR, )) then LR = LR
′
or k+ /∈ Rr.
Encapsulated principals can only be produced with a release(P ) expression or by an input of
the attacker. In the first key, the release reduction (release E) always encrypts the principal
prin(k+, k−,LR) with the keys of LR in the other case since by hypothesis we have K 0Rr k
−
we also have K 0Rr prin(k, r,) for any r so the attacker cannot output this value.
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Finally, we prove that when the annotation is standard, we have K′ 0Rr′ k
− for all k+ ∈ Rr
′.
The result is immediate for reductions which do not change K or Rr.
The set K increases only with the reduction (att. output). The values which contains secret keys
of Rr are of type PrivKeyEnc (or a combination of tuples and encryptions of this type). According
to item 8, any prin(k+, k−, R) is encrypted with R. Moreover, by definition of standard annotation,
all keys prin(ki
+, ki
−, Ri) in Rr are such that all keys of Ri are also in Rr. Since K 0Rr k, the attacker
cannot decrypt the key.
The reduction which modify Rr is (high newPrin), but the new key is fresh so the attacker
cannot derive new facts from the fact that K 0′
Rr
v is syntactically more powerful than K 0Rr v.
Proposition 4 Given a valid initial process P =
(
K |= 〈M1 ◮ C1〉1| . . . |〈Mn ◮ Cn〉n
)
, We have
Rr Mi ⊲ (Ci)(L) : well-annotated for 1 ≤ i ≤ n for any Rr.
Proof. Condition item 6 of well-annotated is true since pc = ⊥ and the tread is L. Since Mi
and Γ only contains principals and public keys, the other conditions which concerns other kind of
values and variables are immediately true.
B.4 Labelled bisimilarity
Lemma 3 When two memories M1 and M2 only contains low locations, M1 0 k− and M2 0 k−
for all k such that k+ ∈ Rr and M1 RRr M2 implies that, for all extended attacker expression f
(Figure 16), obf(Rr,M1(f)) = obf(Rr,M2(f)).
Proof. By induction on the structure of f . This is true if f is a variable or an integer. We
assume that obf(Rr,M1(fi)) = obf(Rr,M2(fi)) for all sub-expressions fi of f . For freshprin(i), i has
to evaluate has an integer. Since the function freshprin(i) returns the i-th principal of a determined
sequence of principals, the expression returns the same key in both memory. For encrr(f), since the
extended expression r has to evaluate to a right it evaluate to the same right for both memories,
so the result is either obfuscated with both memories or none of them. For decrs(f), the result is
immediate if f evaluates to a cipher which is not obfuscated. Otherwise, f is a cipher encrypted
with rights r′, Rr ⊇ r
′, by hypothesis, we have that s cannot corresponds to any key in r′ therefore
the decryption fails (result NaV) in both memories.
Lemma 4 When two memories M1 and M2 only contain low locations, M1 0 k− and M2 0 k− for
all k such that k+ ∈ Rr and M1 RRr M2 implies that M1 ≈s M2.
Proof. Let f and g be two extended expressions which evaluates to the same value v under M1
(M1(f) = M1(g) = v). We show that M2(f) = M2(g). From Lemma 3, we have obf(Rr,M2(f)) =
obf(Rr,M2(g)) = obf(Rr, v). However the obfuscation function does not obfuscate the nonce of
ciphers. And the attacker power does not allow the attacker to generate a cipher with a nonce
which is not fresh (this is due to the fact that nonce cannot be extracted from ciphers from which
the key is unknown). Therefore each nonce is uniquely associated to a unique value. As nonces are
equals the obfuscated values are equals too.
Lemma 5 Given a command context C, a set of public keys Rr, two memories M and M
′, an
expression E and ℓ′ ∈ {L,H}, if we have Rr  ℓ
′ ⊲ (C[E])(M) : well-annotated and Rr  ℓ
′′ ⊲
(C[E])(M ′) : well-annotated, M RRr M
′ , M(E) = (v)L and M ′(E) = (v′)ℓ then obf(Rr, v) =
obf(Rr, v
′).
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Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
1. If E is a variable x with M(E) = (v)L then due to Item 2 of Definition 7, we have xL 7→ (v)L.
By definition of M RRr M
′, we conclude M ′(E) = (v)L.
2. If E is e1+ e2 with M(E) = (v)
L, due to rule (low sum) and (high sum) v is low implies that
none of its sub-expressions is high, we conclude by induction.
3. For E = x[n], the principle is the same.
4. For E = x{E1, . . . , En}, the principle is also the same.
5. If E = encLR′(e) with M(E) = v. If Rr ) LR
′, due to the type rule (enc T), e : B′′R with
M(R′′) ⊇ LR′ ⊇ Rr. According to Lemma 2 e is low, we conclude by induction. If Rr ⊇ R
′,
then obf(Rr, encLR′,n(v)) = encLR′,n( ) so v does not appear.
6. For expressions which involves principals (pub(p) and release(p)) we conclude as principals
are not stored in high location.
Proposition 6 Let K1; Rr |= P1 and K2; Rr |= P2 be two well-annotated processes such that ∀k
+ ∈
Rr, Ki 0Rr k
− (i ∈ {1, 2}) and P1 R P2, we have:
1. if P1
l
−→ P ′1 then P2
l
−→ P ′2 and P
′
1 R P
′
2 for some P
′
2.
2. if P1 → P
′
1, then P2 →
?P ′2 and P
′
1 R P
′
2 for some P
′
2,
Proof. To avoid conflict of indexes, we consider PA and PB instead of P1 and P2.
When the reduction is a labeled reduction with the attacker
• Case where the reduction rule applied to PA is (att. open public) on a thread (connect (cA)att :
Chan(S⊥)⊥;C
′A)(x). From (connect 1 T), we know that Rr ⊇ pc. From Item 4 of Definition 7,
we know that this reduction is possible only when x = L. Hence there exists the same thread
in PB . The reduction on the corresponding thread of PB leads to C ′A through the same label
in(c, S) up to the name of (cB)att, but they are equal up to alpha-renaming of the channel
name. Hence we have the condition on commands of Definition 13. Finally the memory is
unchanged and the attacker does not learn any value any both process: the condition about
memories of Definition 13 and memory equivalence of the attackers hold.
• Case where the reduction rule applied to PA is (att. open server), on a thread (connect (cA)att :
Chan(SR1)R2 to k as P ;C
′A)(x), with label in((c
A)att, ks
−, kc
+, S, r, r′) be the values in the la-
bel of the reduction. Since ks
+ /∈ Rr (according to our hypothesis), due to (att. open server),
k /∈ Rr and due to the type rule (accept 2 T), we have Rr ) R1 and Rr ) R2. According to
Item 4 of Definition 7, the thread is low (x = L). So an identical thread exists in PB , and
since the label enforces S, R1 and R2 to be the sames, it reduces to C
′A up to the renaming
of the channel name. Finally, KA, KB , MA and MB remain the sames.
• The case where the reduction rule applied to PA is (att. open priv client) is similar.
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• Case where the reduction rule applied to PA is (att. output) on a thread (output e〈(c)att〉;C
A)(z),
with label out((cA)att, x). According to Item 5 of Definition 13 the channel is of type
Chan(SR1)R2 with Rr ) R1 and Rr ) R2. According to (output T), we have R2 ) pc and so
Rr ) pc. According to Item 4 of Definition 7 the thread is low (z = L). Therefore there exists
an identical thread in PB where the same label reduction is possible. Moreover, according to
(output T), we have e : R1 with Rr ) R1 so according to Lemma 2, MA(e) = (vA)L for some
vA. According to Lemma 5, we have obf(Rr, v
B) = obf(Rr, v
A), hence KA RK
B .
• Case where the reduction rule applied to PA is (att. input) on a thread (input (c)att(x);C
A)(z)
with label in((cA)att, f). According to Item 5 of Definition 13 the channel is of type Chan(SR1)R2
with Rr ) R1 and Rr ) R2. According to (input T), we have R2 ) pc and so Rr ) pc.
According to Item 4 of Definition 7 the thread is low (z = L). So there is an identi-
cal thread in PB (which reduces with the same label). According to Lemma 3 we have
obf(Rr,K
A(f)) = obf(Rr,K
A(f)). Therefore, the new memories M ′A and M ′B are equivalent.
When the reduction is made on a thread where Rr  M ⊲ (C)(L) : well-annotated In
that case, we use the fact for any thread (CA)(L) on some device with memory M
A on which the
reduction happens, there exists a thread (CB)(L) on the other process with memory M
B such that
CA ≃ CB and MA RRr M
B.
We prove all the requirements sequentially: first, we prove that Rr reduces to the same Rr
′ in
both process. Secondly, we prove the commands reduce to equivalent commands. Thirdly, we prove
the equivalence of the new memories.
1. We have Rr
′A = Rr
′B The one reduction that changes Rr is (high newPrin). When reference
rights change in a reduction due to (high newPrin), the thread is low due to the typing rule so
the reduction can also occurs in process B. We conclude by renaming the new key variables
of both processes to the same name.
2. Reductions rules for CB is the same as for CA: C ′A = C ′B (or both new threads
are high)
There are two cases for “if”, and two cases for “dec”
• The rule CA → C ′A is (high if true) or (high if false). In these cases, according to
Lemma 2, the evaluated expressions was high. So it is also true for CB therefore the
conditional expression of CB also evaluates to a high value according to Lemma 2. On
the other hand, the new thread C ′A is H so whatever CB reduces to the then or the else
branch, the condition about commands of Definition 13 is satisfied.
• The rule CA → C ′A is (low if true) or (low if false). This means the expression eval-
uates to a low value. In addition, the evaluation returns an integer which implies the
expression can only contains +, integers and variables. This implies that the results is
only dependent on low values: since low values in CA and CB are the same both reduce
according to the same rule.
• The rule is (low dec false), (low dec true) or (low thread/high var dec true). Since the
value to decrypt is low, the value in A and B differ only on high sub-terms which means
that the encryption key is the same, so both processes take the same branch.
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• The rule is (high dec false) or (high dec true): whatever (low dec false) or (low dec true)
is taken the thread become high on A and B.
3. New values in memories are such that M ′A RRr M
′B. First of all, because the rights
are the same in CA and CB and premisses on the rules depends only on rights, the high or
low rule is applied for both command.
• Rules that store values into high memory locations (high new), (high assign),
(low thread/high var dec true), (high dec true): they affect high locations so condition
M ′A RRr M
′B holds whatever is the stored value.
• Rules that store values into low memory locations: (low new), (low assign), (low dec true),
(deref S) according to Item 2 of Definition 7, these values are not high so, according to
Lemma 5, we have obf(Rr, v
A) = obf(Rr, v
B).
• Rule (low register): KA is in a low memory location so KA = KB and so the new
principals are identical.
• Creates a principal (high newPrin) and (low newPrin): the new value contains fresh
values and rights that are identical in A and B.
When the reduction is done on a thread C where Rr M ⊲ (C)(H) : well-annotated
1. Internal reductions does not change the equivalence class of the process (so the other process
can simulate it with no reduction). Indeed, first, there is no reduction that reduces a high
thread to a low thread: the reduced command C ′ does not impact the equivalence class of the
process. Secondly, the reductions that create or change memories location are: (high new),
(high dec true) and (high assign). In each case, the type rules states that pc ⊇ R where R is
the right of the memory. Due to Item 4 of Definition 7, we have that pc is high. Hence R is
high too, so the rule either creates or change a memory location with flag H.
When the reduction is made between two threads C1 and C2 where C1 is high.
• If both C1 and C2 are high. The only possible reduction are (high i/o) and (high open priv).
In case of (high open priv), from Item 6, we have Rr ⊇ pc. The types rules (connect 2 T)
and (accept 2 T) enforces that R1 and R2 are high. Due to Item 3, the channel is annotated
with cH(H). In case of (high i/o), the type rules (input T) enforces that all received values are
stored into high memory. Since high threads and high memory locations are free to differ
between the two processes, the equivalence is preserved after reduction.
• If C2 is low. Any annotation variant of the rule (i/o S) is not possible when one thread is
low and the other is high. Indeed, according to Item 3 of Definition 7, there is no cHH channel
on the low thread. On the other high thread, a cLL or c
H
L channel has a low type according
to Item 3 of Definition 7, so according to (output T) and (input T) they cannot be used one
this thread.
So only establishing connection is possible with rule (high open priv) where the client is
on the low thread C2 and the server is on the high thread C1. Due to the reduction rule
(high open priv), C ′2 is a high thread and C
′
1 is high too so the equivalence is preserved in
both processes.
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When the reduction is made on two threads which are low.
For all communication opening rules, rights in both process are identical since the public keys of
the rights set are public. So both processes thread reduces either to a high thread or a low thread.
Hence the two reduced processes remains in the same equivalent class.
For the input/output reduction rule (low i/o), according to Item 6 of Definition 7, the channel
type can only be cLL or c
H
L since the threads are low. On the output thread, high values are sent
only on cHL channels. According to Item 3, on the input side c
H
L has type Chan(SR)R′ with Rr ⊇ R.
According to (input T), the value is stored in a high memory location so even if the values differ
between PA and PB memories are still equivalent. On the other hand, if the values vA and vB sent
on the channels are not high then they have to be equivalence: obf(Rr, v
A) = obf(Rr, v
B).
Proposition 5 Let PA be (KA; Rr |= νc¯.Q
A) and PB be (KB ; Rr |= νc¯
′.QB), where both are well-
annotated processes such that PA R PB, Furthermore assume that for all k+ ∈ Rr we have K
A 0Rr
k−. Then the processes are annotated equivalent, PA ≈l P
B (with the annotations removed).
Proof. The first item is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 The two last items are a consequence
of Proposition 6 with the fact that when the annotation is standard, according to Proposition 3, we
have that ∀k+ ∈ Rr, Ki 0Rr k
− is preserved by the reduction, so the proposition can be generalized
to any number of reduction steps.
B.5 Main theorems
Theorem 2 Let P be a valid initial process. We consider a reduction P → P ′ with P ′ = D′1| . . . |D
′
n
such that for some i, D′i is 〈M ◮ new x : SR = E;C | C
′〉. Let v be any value of type S. Let
P ′′ = D′′1 | . . . |D
′′
n such that P
′ → ∗P ′′ then there exists Q′′ such that P ′x=v →
∗Q′′ where for all
memory location y that have been created in any device with rights Rl with R ) Rl, we have
obf(R, vP ) = obf(R, v
′
Q) where vP is the value of y in P
′′ and vQ the value of y in Q
′′.
Proof. Since there is no untyped attacker, we can use non-standard annotations. We consider
the one such that at the beginning Rr contains all the keys of R which are present in some memory,
and which add a key in Rr if and only if this key is in R. From Proposition 6 on this annotated
process, we get the existence of Q such that Q≈ℓP
′′ which imply that for all memory Mi in P
′′ and
M ′i in Q, we have Mi RR M
′
i . By definition of RR, we conclude.
C Annotated rules
We define ↑ (x, y) to be L except if x = y = H.
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fresh(k) fresh(P ′)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (newPrin PR; C)(x)〉A
→ K; Rr ∪ {k
+} |= 〈M ∪ P ′ 7→ prin(k+, k−, R) ◮ (C{P ′/P})(x)〉A
(high newPrin)
fresh(k) freshP ′
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (newPrin PR; C)(x)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ P
′ 7→ prin(k+, k−, R) ◮ (C{P ′/P})(x)〉A
(low newPrin)
M(e) = (encn,R(prin(k1
+, k1
−, R1)))
a M(P2) = prin(k2
+, k2
−, R2) k2
+ ∈ R1 fresh(P3)
〈M ◮ (registerP2 e as P1 then C1 else C2)(x)〉A
→ 〈M ∪ PL3 7→ prin(k1
+, k1
−, R1) ◮ (C1{P3/P1})(x)〉A
(low register)
M(p) = prin(k+, k−, r)
M(e) = (encRS,n(v))
a RS ⊇M(R1) k
+ ∈M(R1) fresh(y) Rr )M(R1)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptp e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A
→ K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ y
L 7→ v ◮ (C1{y/x})(z)〉A
(low dec true)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, r)
M(e) = (encRS,n(v))
H RS ⊇M(R1) k
+ ∈M(R1) fresh(y) Rr )M(R1)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptP e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A
→ K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ y
L 7→ v ◮ (C1{y/x})(H)〉A
(high thread/low var dec true)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, r)
M(e) = encRS,n(v) RS ⊇M(R1) k
+ ∈M(R1) fresh(y) Rr ⊇M(R1)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptP e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A
→ K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ y
H 7→ v ◮ (C1{y/x})(z)〉A
(low thread/high var dec true)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, r)
M(e) = (encRS,n(v))
H RS ⊇M(R1) k
+ ∈M(R1) fresh(y) Rr ⊇M(R1)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptP e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A
→ K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ y
H 7→ v ◮ (C1{y/x})(H)〉A
(high dec true)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, r) M(e) = encRS,n(v) (RS )M(R1) ∨ k
+ /∈M(R1))
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptP e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C2)(z)〉A
(low dec false)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, r) M(e) = (encRS,n(v))
H (RS )M(R1) ∨ k
+ /∈M(R1))
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (decryptP e as x :SR1 then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C2)(H)〉A
(high dec false)
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M(e) = (v)t fresh(y) Rr ⊆M(R)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (new x :SR = e; C)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ x
H 7→ (v)H ◮ (C{y/x})(z)〉A
(high new)
M(e) = (v)t Rr  M(R) fresh(y)
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (new x :SR = e; C)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ x
L 7→ (v)t ◮ (C)(z)〉A
(low new)
(M ∪ xL 7→ (v)t)(e) = (v′)t
′
K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ x
L 7→ v ◮ (x := e; C)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M,x
L 7→ (v′)t
′
◮ (C)(z)〉A
(low assign)
(M ∪ xH 7→ (v)H)(e) = (v′)t
K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ x
H 7→ (v)H ◮ (x := e; C)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ∪ x
H 7→ (v′)H ◮ (C)(z)〉A
(high assign)
M(e1) = (v)
L M(e2) = (v)
L
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C1)(z)〉A
(low if true)
M(e1) = (v)
L M(e2) = (v
′)L v 6= v′
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C2)(z)〉A
(low if false)
M(e1) = (v)
t M(e2) = (v
′)t
′
↑ (t, t′) = H
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C1)(H)〉A
(high if true)
M(e1) = (v)
t M(e2) = (v
′)t
′
v 6= v′ ↑ (t, t′) = L
K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (if(e1 = e2) then C1 else C2)(z)〉A → K; Rr |= 〈M ◮ (C2)(H)〉A
(high if false)
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fresh(c) M1(Ps) = prin(Ks
+,Ks
−, Rs) M2(Pc) = prin(Kc
+,Kc
−, Rc) M1(R1) = M2(R
′
1)
M1(R2) =M2(R
′
2) M1(kc) = Kc
+ M2(ks) = Ks
+
Rr ⊇M1(R1) Rr ⊇M1(R2)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (accept c1 :Chan(SR1)R2 from kc as Ps; C1)(z)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (connect c2 :Chan(SR′
1
)R′
2
to ks as Pc; C2)(z′)〉B → K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1{c
H
(H)/c1})(H)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (C2{c
H
(H)/c2})(H)〉B
(high open priv)
fresh(c) M1(Ps) = prin(Ks
+,Ks
−, Rs) M2(Pc) = prin(Kc
+,Kc
−, Rc) M1(R1) = M2(R
′
1)
M1(R2) =M2(R
′
2) M1(kc) = Kc
+ M2(ks) = Ks
+
Rr )M1(R1) Rr )M1(R2)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (accept c1 :Chan(SR1)R2 from kc as Ps; C1)(z)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (connect c2 :Chan(SR′
1
)R′
2
to ks as Pc; C2)(z′)〉B → K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1{c
L
(L)/c1})(z)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (C2{c
L
(L)/c2})(z′)〉B
(low open priv)
fresh(c) M1(Ps) = prin(Ks
+,Ks
−, Rs) M2(Pc) = prin(Kc
+,Kc
−, Rc) M1(R1) = M2(R
′
1)
M1(R2) =M2(R
′
2) M1(kc) = Kc
+ M2(ks) = Ks
+
Rr )M1(R1) Rr ⊇M1(R2)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (accept c1 :Chan(SR1)R2 from kc as Ps; C1)(z)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (connect c2 :Chan(SR′
1
)R′
2
to ks as Pc; C2)(z′)〉B → K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1{c
H
(L)/c1})(z)〉A
|〈M2 ◮ (C2{c
H
(L)/c2})(z′)〉B
(low thread/high value open priv)
M1(e) = v fresh(y)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (output E〈c
H
(ℓ)〉; C1)(z)〉A |〈M2 ◮ (input c
H
(ℓ)(x); C2)(z′)〉B
→ K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1)(z)〉A |〈M2 ∪ y
H 7→ (v)H ◮ (C2{y/x})(z′)〉B
(high i/o)
M1(e) = v fresh(y)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (output e〈c
L
(L)〉;C1)(z)〉A |〈M2 ◮ (input c
L
(L)(X);C2)(z′)〉B
→ K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1)(z)〉A |〈M2 ∪ y
L 7→ v ◮ (C2{y/x})(z′)〉B
(low i/o)
M(P ) = prin(k+, k−, R) R 6= {} fresh(n)
M(release(P )) = (encR,n(prin(k
+, k−, R)))L
(ann. release)
M(e) = (v)t fresh(n)
M(encRS(e)) = (encRS,n((v)
t)))L
(ann. enc)
M(e1) = (v1)
H M(e2) = (v2)
t
M(e1 + e2) = (v1 + v2)
H
(high sum)
M(e1) = (v1)
L M(e2) = (v2)
L
M(e1 + e2) = (v1 + v2)
L
(low sum)
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fresh(c)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (connect c1 :Chan(S⊥)⊥; C1)(x)〉A
in(c,S)
−−−−→ K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1{(c)att/c1})(x)〉A
(att. open public)
K(f) = {ks
−, kc
+, S, r, r′}
M2(R) = r M2(R
′) = r′M2(k) = ks
+ M2(P ) = prin(kc
+, kc
−, r′) fresh(c)
K; Rr |= 〈M2 ◮ (connect c2 :Chan(SR1)R2 to k as P ; C2)(x)〉A
in(c,f)
−−−−→ K; Rr |= 〈M2 ◮ (C2{(c)att/c2})(x)〉A
(att. open priv client)
K(f) = {ks
+, kc
−, S, r, r′}
M1(k) = kc
+ M1(P ) = prin(ks
+, ks
−, r′) M1(R) = r M1(R
′) = r′ fresh(c)
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (accept c1 :Chan(SR1)R2 from k as P ; C1)(x)〉A
in(c,f)
−−−−→ K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1{(c)att/c1})(x)〉A
(att. open server)
M1(e) = (v)
t
K; Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (output e〈(c)att〉;C1)(z)〉A
out(c,m)
−−−−−→ K ∪ (mL 7→ (v)L); Rr |= 〈M1 ◮ (C1)(z)〉A
(att. output)
K(E) = (v)Lfresh(y)
K; Rr |= 〈M2 ◮ (input (c)att(x); C)(z)〉A
in(c,E)
−−−−→ K; Rr |= 〈M2 ∪ y
L 7→ v ◮ (C{y/x})(z)〉A
(att. input)
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